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Random Dictatorship Domains
Shurojit Chatterji ∗, Arunava Sen † and Huaxia Zeng ‡
June 22, 2012
Abstract
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-
proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain, is a
random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random
dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random
dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not ran-
dom dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition
(introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dicta-
torship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is a
ramification result that shows that under certain assumptions, a domain that is a ran-
dom dictatorship domain for two voters is also a random dictatorship domain for an
arbitrary number of voters.
1 Introduction
It has long been understood that allowing for randomization significantly enlarges the
set of incentive-compatible social choice functions. The reason for this is clear. Out-
comes in a random social choice functions are lotteries and it is typically assumed
that player preferences over lotteries satisfy domain restrictions. If they satisfy the
von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis, then convex combinations of
deterministic incentive-compatible social choice functions are also incentive-compatible
in the random environment. The converse question is more interesting and much
harder: for what preference domains is it the case that every incentive-compatible
randomized social choice function is a convex combination of incentive-compatible de-
terministic social choice functions? We address a specific version of this question in
voting environments.
A voting environment is one where monetary compensation for players is not fea-
sible. According to the classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard (1973), Sat-
terthwaite (1975)) in this environment, the only dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
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(or strategy-proof) social choice functions that satisfy the mild requirement of unanim-
ity are dictatorial, provided that voters’ preferences belong to the universal domain.1
In a subsequent paper, Gibbard (1977) characterized the class of strategy-proof ran-
dom social choice functions over the universal domain. An immediate consequence
of this powerful result is that strategy-proof random social choice functions that sat-
isfy unanimity are random dictatorships. A random dictatorship is a fixed probability
distribution over dictatorial social choice functions. In other words, if social choice
functions are assumed to satisfy unanimity, then the universal domain has the prop-
erty that we alluded to in the earlier paragraph: every strategy-proof random social
choice function is a convex combination of deterministic strategy-proof social choice
functions. Related results have been proved for the domain of two alternatives (see
Picot and Sen (2011)) and in some auctions settings (see Mehta and Vazirani (2004),
Manelli and Vincent (2007)).2
In our terminology, the universal domain is both a dictatorial domain as well as a
random dictatorship domain. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between
these kinds of domains. Does the property of the universal domain generalize? i.e.,
is every dictatorial domain a random dictatorship domain? We show this is false by
means of an example with seven alternatives and twenty-two preference orderings. We
also identify general conditions under which dictatorial domains are not random dic-
tatorship domains. We also specify two sets of conditions that ensure that a domain is
a random dictatorship domain. These conditions are significantly stronger than those
that force a domain to be dictatorial. The strength of these conditions suggest that
randomization permits a much richer class of strategy-proof random social choice func-
tions than the convex hull of deterministic strategy-proof social choice functions. We
note here that this occurs despite the fact that the notion of random strategy-proofness
that we use (following Gibbard (1977)) is very strong. In particular, it requires the ex-
pected utility from the truth-telling lottery to be greater than the expected utility from
misrepresentation for every utility representation of true preferences. Equivalently, the
lottery from truth-telling must first-order stochastically dominate every lottery arising
from a misrepresentation.
Our results rely heavily on the approach in Aswal et al. (2003). They introduced
the notion of a linked domain and showed that every linked domain is dictatorial. We
construct an example of a linked domain that admits a non-dictatorial strategy-proof
random social choice function that satisfies unanimity. We then show that random
dictatorship is restored when the connectivity graph induced by a linked domain, is
strengthened suitably. In particular, we assume the existence of a hub alternative that
is connected with every other alternative. We also provide an alternative sufficient
condition in a different way. We strengthen the connectedness requirement underlying
the definition of a linked domain to obtain the notion of a strongly linked domain; we
then impose an additional condition that is however weaker than the counterpart of
1There is also an additional requirement that the number of alternatives is at least three .
2Auction settings refer to models where monetary compensation is permissible and player utility functions
are quasi-linear.
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the hub condition.
The proofs of our sufficiency result rely on a ramification result that states that a
random dictatorship domain when there are two voters is in fact, a random dictatorship
domain when there is an arbitrary number of voters. This approach was initiated in
Kalai and Muller (1977) in the context of domains that permit non-dictatorial Arrovian
aggregation. Corresponding results for dictatorial domains appear in Kim and Roush
(1989), Sen (2001) and Aswal et al. (2003). The result for random dictatorship is
however, significantly more difficult than its dictatorial domains counterpart. In fact,
we are able to prove it only under an additional hypothesis which is fortunately weak
and satisfied by the sufficiency conditions. We believe that this result is of independent
interest.
We now proceed to details.
2 Preliminaries
The model in the paper is completely standard (see Gibbard (1973), Aswal et al. (2003))
- we therefore introduce the required notation and definitions without comment.
We let A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} be a finite set of alternatives where |A| = m and
m ≥ 3. The set I = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of voters with |I| = N and N ≥ 2.
Each voter i has a (preference) ordering Pi ∈ D over the elements of A. The set D is
referred to as the preference domain. It is assumed that D ⊂ P where P is the set of all
antisymmetric orderings over the elements of A. For any a, b ∈ A, aPib is interpreted
as “a is strictly preferred to b according to Pi.” We let rk(Pi) denote the kth ranked
alternative in Pi, k = 1, . . . ,m, i.e., [rk(Pi) = a] ⇒ [|{b ∈ A : bPia}| = k − 1]. Let the
map b : A→ {1, 2, . . . ,m} denote a function such that b(ak) = k, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and
let ek ∈ Rm denote a unit row vector, where the kth element is 1 and the remaining
elements are zeros.
A preference profile P ∈ DN is an N -tuple (P1, . . . , PN ). Finally, let L(A) denote
the set of lotteries over the elements of the set A.
Definition 1 A Random Social Choice Function (RSCF) is a map ϕ : DN → L(A).
For every profile P , ϕ(P ) ≡ [ϕa1(P ) ϕa2(P ) . . . ϕam(P ) ] is a probability vector.
We follow the notion of incentive-compatibility introduced in Gibbard (1977). A
RSCF is strategy-proof if no voter can obtain a strictly higher expected utility by
misreporting her preferences for any utility representation of her true preference and
any beliefs regarding the reports of other voters.
Definition 2 A utility function u : A → R represents the ordering Pi over A, if for
all a, b ∈ A, [ aPi b ]⇔ [u(a) > u(b) ].
Let U(Pi) denote the set of utility functions that represent Pi, while Ui(P ) =∑
x∈A u(x)ϕx(P ) given any u ∈ U(Pi), denotes the von-Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility function of voter i under the profile P .
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Definition 3 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is strategy-proof, if for all i ∈ I; Pi, P ′i ∈ D,
P−i ∈ DN−1 and u ∈ U(Pi), we have Ui(Pi, P−i) ≥ Ui(P ′i , P−i).
The notion of strategy-proofness can be equivalently formulated in terms of stochas-
tic dominance.
Definition 4 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is strategy-proof, if for all i ∈ I; Pi, P ′i ∈ D
and P−i ∈ DN−1, we have
∑t
k=1 ϕrk(Pi)(Pi, P−i) ≥
∑t
k=1 ϕrk(Pi)(P
′
i , P−i) for all t =
1, 2, . . . ,m.
If there exists a profile P , a voter i, a preference P ′i and t ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} such
that
∑t
k=1 ϕrk(Pi)(Pi, P−i) <
∑t
k=1 ϕrk(Pi)(P
′
i , P−i), we shall say that i manipulates ϕ
at P via P ′i .
Throughout the paper, we will assume that RSCF’s under consideration satisfy
unanimity. This property requires an alternative to be selected with certainty if it is
ranked first by all voters.
Definition 5 A RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) satisfies unanimity if for all P ∈ DN and
aj ∈ A, [aj = r1(Pi) for all i ∈ I]⇒ [ϕaj (P ) = 1].
A RSCF of particular importance is random dictatorship.
Definition 6 The RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is a random dictatorship if there exists
βi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ I with
∑N
i=1 βi = 1 such that for all P ∈ DN , ϕ(P ) =
∑N
i=1 βi eb(r1(Pi)).
The focus of our paper are random dictatorship domains which have the property
that every strategy-proof and unanimous RSCF defined on them, is a random dicta-
torship.
Definition 7 A domain D is a random dictatorship domain, if every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is a random dictatorship.
A fundamental result in random mechanism design theory proved in Gibbard (1977)
is that the domain P is a a random dictatorship domain (see also Duggan (1996), Sen
(2011)).
Theorem 1 The domain P is a random dictatorship domain.
The notions of a RSCF, strategy-proofness and random dictatorship have famil-
iar deterministic counterparts. Thus a deterministic RSCF or simply a social choice
function (SCF) is a RSCF whose output at every profile is a degenerate probability
distribution. Similarly, dictatorship is a special case of random dictatorship where
exactly one of the coefficients βi in Definition 6 is one and all others are zero. A
dictatorial domain is similarly a domain where every strategy-proof and unanimous
social choice function is dictatorial. According to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
(Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)), the domain P is a dictatorial domain.
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A central concern of this paper is the relationship between dictatorial and random
dictatorship domains. It is easily verified that a random dictatorship domain is dicta-
torial. The question of interest is clearly the converse question. As we have remarked,
the universal domain is both a dictatorial and a random dictatorship domain. Does
this relationship hold true generally? In order to investigate this question, we recall
the main result of Aswal et al. (2003) on dictatorial domains.
Some additional notation will be helpful here. For every non-empty B ⊂ A, we
let DB = {Pi ∈ D : r1(Pi) ∈ B}. For a mutually disjoint non-empty pair B,C ⊂ A,
DB,C = {Pi ∈ D : r1(Pi) ∈ B and r2(Pi) ∈ C}. If B and C are singletons with
B = {b} and C = {c}, we write DB as Db and DB,C as Db,c.
Definition 8 Let D be a domain. A pair of alternatives a, b is connected (denoted by
a ∼ b) if Da,b 6= ∅ and Db,a 6= ∅.
A domain induces a connectivity graph as follows: the set of nodes of the graph is
the set of alternatives and two nodes a and b have an edge connecting them iff a ∼ b.
Definition 9 Let D be a domain. Let B ⊂ A and a /∈ B. Then, a is linked to B if
there exist b, c ∈ B such that a ∼ b and a ∼ c.
Definition 10 The domain D is linked, if there exists an one to one function σ :
{1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,m} such that
(i) aσ(1) ∼ aσ(2).
(ii) aσ(j) is linked to {aσ(1), . . . aσ(j−1)}, j = 3, . . . ,m.
The notion of a linked domain is formulated entirely in terms of alternatives that
can be ranked first and second according to preferences in the domain. A domain is
linked if its associated connectivity graph is rich enough. The reader is referred to
Aswal et al. (2003) for details and numerous examples. The following result is their
main result.
Theorem 2 A linked domain is dictatorial.
A natural question is whether a linked domain is a random dictatorship domain.
This is addressed in the next section.
3 Examples
3.1 A Specific Case
In this section, we provide an example of a dictatorial domain that is not a random
dictatorship domain.
Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7}. The domain DL of preferences over these seven
alternatives is described in Appendix A. The following features of the domain are
critical and can be readily verified.
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1. Domain DL is linked. Its connectivity graph is shown in Figure 1. Note that
|DL| = 22. Since Aswal et al. (2003) have demonstrated that the minimal car-
dinality of a linked domain is 4m − 6, domain DL is in fact a linked domain of
minimal size.
2. [Pk ∈ Da1,a3L ∪ Da3,a1L ]⇒ [a2 = rm(Pk)]. Whenever a1 and a3 are ranked first and
second or vice-versa, a2 is ranked last.
3. [Pk /∈ Da1,a3L ∪Da3,a1L ]⇒ [a2 ∈ {r1(Pk), r2(Pk), r3(Pk)}]. If Condition 2 above does
not apply, a2 is ranked either first, second or third.
q q q q
q q q
a3 a4 a7 a2
a1 a5 a6
Figure 1: Connectivity Graph of Domain DL
According to Theorem 2, DL is a dictatorial domain. However, as Proposition 1
below shows, it is not a random dictatorship domain.
Proposition 1 The domain DL is not a random dictatorship domain.
Proof: It suffices to construct a unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial RSCF
ϕ : D2L → L(A).3 Let I = {i, j} and consider the RSCF ϕ below:
ϕ(Pi, Pj) =
{
ε eb(r1(Pi)) + α eb(r2(Pj)) + (1− ε− α)e2 if Pi ∈ Da1,a3L ∪ Da3,a1L and Pj ∈ Da2L
ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)) otherwise.
where 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < α ≤ min(ε, 1− ε).
Thus, ϕ is a random dictatorship with weights ε and 1−ε on the best alternatives of
voters i and j at all profiles except when i’s first and second ranked alternatives are a1
and a3 or vice-versa and j’s best alternative is a2. In this case, probability weight α is
transferred from a2 to j’s second ranked alternative. It is evident that ϕ is unanimous
and not a random dictatorship. We only need to check that ϕ is strategy-proof. In
order to do this, it suffices to consider only the seven cases below.
Case 1: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pj ∈ Da2L and Pi /∈ Da1,a3L ∪ Da3,a1L . Voter i considers
a manipulation via P ′i ∈ Da1,a3L ∪ Da3,a1L .
Let u ∈ U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi, Pj) − Ui(P ′i , Pj) =
ε u(r1(Pi)) + αu(a2)− ε u(r1(P ′i ))− αu(r2(Pj)). If a2 Pi r2(Pj), then Ui(Pi, Pj)−
Ui(P
′
i , Pj) ≥ 0. Suppose r2(Pj)Pi a2. Note that r2(Pj) ∈ {a6, a7} (refer to P4
and P5 in Appendix A). Whenever a6Pia2 or a7Pia2, we have a2Pia1 and a2Pia3,
i.e., a2Pir1(P
′
i ). Hence, Ui(Pi, Pj)−Ui(P ′i , Pj) = α
[
u(r1(Pi))− u(r2(Pj))
]
+ (ε−
α)
[
u(r1(Pi))− u(r1(P ′i ))
]
+ α
[
u(a2)− u(r1(P ′i ))
]
≥ 0.
3In case there are more than two voters, the additional voters can be made dummies whose preferences
have no bearing on the outcome.
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Case 2: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pj ∈ Da2L and Pi ∈ Da1,a3L ∪ Da3,a1L . Voter i considers
a manipulation via P ′i /∈ Da1,a3L ∪ Da3,a1L .
Let u ∈ U(Pi). Since Pi ∈ Da1,a3L ∪Da3,a1L , r2(Pj)Pia2. Hence the loss from misrep-
resentation is Ui(Pi, Pj)− Ui(P ′i , Pj) = ε
[
u(r1(Pi))− u(r1(P ′i ))
]
+ α
[
u(r2(Pj))−
u(a2)
]
≥ 0
Case 3: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pj ∈ Da2L and Pi ∈ Da1,a3L . Voter i considers a
manipulation via P ′i where P
′
i ∈ Da3,a1L .
Let u ∈ U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi, Pj) − Ui(P ′i , Pj) =
ε
[
u(a1)− u(a3)
]
≥ 0.
Case 4: The profile is (Pi, Pj), where Pj ∈ Da2L and Pi ∈ Da3,a1L . Voter i considers a
manipulation via P ′i where P
′
i ∈ Da1,a3L .
Let u ∈ U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi, Pj) − Ui(P ′i , Pj) =
ε
[
u(a3)− u(a1)
]
≥ 0.
Case 5: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pi ∈ Da1,a3L ∪Da3,a1L and Pj /∈ Da2L . Voter j considers
a manipulation via P ′j where P
′
j ∈ Da2L .
Let u ∈ U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi, Pj) − Uj(Pi, P ′j) =
(1− ε− α)
[
u(r1(Pj))− u(a2)
]
+ α
[
u(r1(Pj))− u(r2(P ′j))
]
≥ 0.
Case 6: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pi ∈ Da1,a3L ∪Da3,a1 and Pj ∈ Da2L . Voter j considers
a manipulation via P ′j where P
′
j /∈ Da2L .
Let u ∈ U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi, Pj) − Uj(Pi, P ′j) =
(1− ε− α)
[
u(a2)− u(r1(P ′j))
]
+ α
[
u(r2(Pj))− u(r1(P ′j))
]
≥ 0.
Case 7: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pi ∈ Da1,a3L ∪Da3,a1 and Pj ∈ Da2L . Voter j considers
a manipulation via P ′j where P
′
j ∈ Da2L and P ′j 6= Pj .
Let u ∈ U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi, Pj) − Uj(Pi, P ′j) =
α
[
u(r2(Pj))− u(r2(P ′j))
]
≥ 0.
We conclude that ϕ is strategy-proof.
3.2 A General Case
The example we provided in Section 3.1 is not the simplest case of a linked domain
that admits strategy-proof, unanimous and non-dictatorial RSCF’s, since our objective
was to use one example to cover the two domains that follow in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Here, we provide simpler but more general restrictions that generate linked domains
that are not randomly dictatorial. We do not restrict the cardinality of either the set
of alternatives or the domains.
Given a ∈ A, let S(a) = {x ∈ A : there exists Pk ∈ Da, such that x = r2(Pk)}. It
is evident that a /∈ S(a). We consider a minimally rich domain DNRD defined below.
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Definition 11 A minimally rich domain satisfies the Condition NRD, denoted DNRD,
if there exist x, y ∈ A such that
(i) y /∈ S(x), x /∈ S(y) and S(x) ∩ S(y) = ∅.
(ii) For all Pk ∈ DxNRD and z ∈ S(y), zPky.
(iii) For all Pk ∈ DA\{x,y}NRD , [ there exists z ∈ S(y) such that zPky ]⇒ [yPkx].
Remark 1 The domain DNRD must have at least 4 alternatives.
Proposition 2 The domain DNRD is not a random dictatorship domain.
The proof of the Proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and is relegated
to Appendix B.
Next, we investigate the compatibility of the restrictions needed in Condition NRD
with linked domains. We first restate the definition of linked domains in terms of a
graph. Let G be a graph, the set of whose nodes is A. A path in G is a sequence
{aγ(k)}Tk=1 such that every pair (aγ(k−1), aγ(k)), k = 1, . . . , T , is an edge. Graph G is
connected if for all aj , ak ∈ A, there exists a path connecting aj and ak.
Definition 12 The connected graph G is linked, if there exists an one to one function
σ : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,m} such that
(i) (aσ(1), aσ(2)) is an edge.
(ii) For all j = 3, . . . ,m, there exist a, b ∈ {aσ(1), . . . , aσ(j−1)} such that (a, aσ(j)) and
(b, aσ(j)) are both edges.
Fix a domain D. Let G(D) denote the connectivity graph of domain D. A domain
D is linked iff G(D) is linked. The following proposition provides conditions on a linked
graph G such that there exists a linked domain DL with G(DL) = G and furthermore
DL satisfies the Condition NRD.
Proposition 3 Given a linked graph G, if there exist x, y ∈ A such that
(i) (x, y) is not an edge,
(ii) for all z ∈ A where (x, z) is an edge, (y, z) is not an edge; and for all z′ ∈ A
where (y, z′) is an edge, (x, z′) is not an edge,
then there exists a linked domain DL with G(DL) = G such that DL satisfies the Con-
dition NRD.
Proof: We construct DL by following three steps:
Step 1: For all a, b ∈ A, if (a, b) is an edge, generate two preference orderings Pk, P ′k
such that (i) r1(Pk) = a = r2(P
′
k), (ii) r2(Pk) = b = r1(P
′
k) and (iii) all relative
rankings among A\{a, b} in both Pk and P ′k are unrestricted.
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Step 2: For all incomplete preference ordering Pk generated in Step 1, such that r1(Pk) =
x, let y = rm(Pk). Next, let the relative rankings between r2(Pk) and rm(Pk) be
arbitrary.
Step 3: For all incomplete preference ordering Pk generated in Step 1, such that r1(Pk) ∈
A\{x}, if y ∈ {r1(Pk), r2(Pk)}, let the relative rankings beyond r2(Pk) be arbi-
trary; if y /∈ {r1(Pk), r2(Pk)}, let y = r3(Pk) and let the relative rankings beyond
r3(Pk) be arbitrary .
Step 1 specifies every preference ordering’s top two alternatives which indicates that
for all a, b ∈ A, if (a, b) is an edge, then a ∼ b in domain DL; and if (a, b) is not an
edge, then Da,bL = ∅ and Db,aL = ∅. Hence, by Definition 12, domain DL is linked. It is
evident that the restrictions on graph G imply that DL satisfies the first restriction of
the Condition NRD. Next, since (x, y) is not an edge, Step 2 does not contradict Step
1. Since y is ranked last in every preference ordering Pk with r1(Pk) = x, domain DL
meets the second restriction of the Condition NRD.
It is evident that Step 3 does not contradict Steps 1 and 2. We next check whether
domain DL satisfies the third restriction of the Condition NRD. According to Step 1, we
know that for all a ∈ A, whenever (a, y) is not an edge, Dy,aL = ∅ and hence a /∈ S(y).
Thus, to show that the third restriction of the Condition NRD is not violated by
domain DL, it suffices to show that for every preference ordering Pk ∈ DA\{x,y}L with
xPky, there exists no alternative a ∈ A such that (a, y) is an edge and aPky. Since
r1(Pk) 6= x and y ∈ {r1(Pk), r2(Pk), r3(Pk)} by Step 3, xPky implies that x = r2(Pk).
Then, according to Step 1, we know that (r1(Pk), x) is an edge. Furthermore, by the
second restriction on G, (r1(Pk), y) is never an edge. In conclusion, domain DL satisfies
the third restriction of the Condition NRD.
Remark 2 To construct a linked domain satisfying the Condition NRD, we need at
least 6 alternatives.4 Furthermore, linked domains satisfying the Condition NRD need
not be the minimal size linked domains.
In the remainder of the paper, we will provide sufficient conditions for a domain to
be a random dictatorship domain.
4 Ramification from two to an arbitrary num-
ber of voters
Our first step is to show that a random dictatorship domain when there are exactly
two voters, is also a random dictatorship domain when there are more than two voters,
provided an additional condition is satisfied. A result of this kind was first established in
Kalai and Muller (1977) which showed that a domain where all Arrovian social welfare
functions are dictatorial when there are two voters also admits only dictatorial Arrovian
4It is possible to construct a linked domain with 5 alternatives which satisfies the connectivity graph
Figure 2 (e) and is not a random dictatorship domain.
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social welfare functions when there are more than two voters. A similar property has
been shown for deterministic strategy-proof SCFs (Kim and Roush (1989), see also Sen
(2001), Aswal et al. (2003), Chatterji and Sen (2011)). In particular, a domain where
all strategy-proof SCFs satisfying unanimity are dictatorial when there are two voters,
is also a domain where all strategy-proof SCFs satisfying unanimity are dictatorial for
an arbitrary number of voters. A property of this kind is, of course, interesting in its
own right. In addition, it is very helpful analytically; in order to determine whether
a domain is dictatorial, it suffices to verify that every two-voter strategy-proof SCF
satisfying unanimity defined on it is dictatorial.
In this section we provide a result relating the two-voter with the many-voter case
for RSCF’s. Unfortunately, this appears to be a significantly more difficult question to
resolve than the corresponding one in the deterministic case. We are able to prove it
only by making an additional assumption.
Definition 13 The domain D satisfies the triple-property if there exist a, b, c ∈ A such
that a ∼ b, b ∼ c and c ∼ a.
A domain satisfies the triple property if its connectivity graph has a triangle sub-
graph. We also need an assumption that is very mild and is standard in the literature.
Definition 14 The domain D is minimally rich if Da 6= ∅ for all a ∈ A.
A minimally rich domain has the property that every alternative is ranked first by
some preference ordering in the domain. This assumption excludes some trivial cases
from consideration.
Theorem 3 Let D be a minimally rich domain, satisfying the triple property. The
following two statements are equivalent:
(a) ϕ : D2 → L(A) is unanimous and strategy-proof ⇒ ϕ is a random dictatorship.
(b) ϕ : DN → L(A), N ≥ 2, is unanimous and strategy-proof ⇒ ϕ is a random
dictatorship.
The proof of the result is in Appendix C.
Remark 3 In Appendix C, we prove a stronger version of Theorem 3 by using a weaker
version of the triple condition. The triple condition is a fairly weak condition satisfied
by all linked domains. We can therefore use Theorem 3 to prove our random dicta-
torship results. The circular domain (Sato (2010)) is a dictatorial domain that does
not satisfy the triple condition; however, it satisfies the weaker condition in Appendix
C that we use to prove the result. A positive feature of our additional assumption
therefore is that the triple condition or its weaker counterpart are often required to
prove dictatorship or random dictatorship even in the two voter case. Domains that
violate the weaker assumption such as the single-peaked domain (see Demange (1982),
Danilov (1994)) are not dictatorial for any number of voters.
10
5 Random Dictatorship Results
In this section we provide two conditions that ensure that a domain is a random dicta-
torship domain. The first imposes a great degree of connectivity in the linked domain
connectivity graph. The second strengthens the requirement for the connectedness of
two alternatives but imposes a weaker requirement on the connectivity graph.
5.1 Linked Domains with Condition H
We impose the following condition on the connectedness structure of domains.
Definition 15 A domain D satisfies Condition H if there exists a ∈ A such that b ∼ a,
for all b ∈ A\{a}.
The alternative a that is connected to all other alternatives will be referred to as
a hub. It is clear that both domain DL (Figure 1 and Appendix A) in Section 3.1
and domain DNRD in Section 3.2 violate Condition H. We provide examples of six
connectivity graphs below to illustrate the relation between Condition H and linked
domains.
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Figure 2: Connectivity Graphs
In diagram (a), the domain is not linked but satisfies Condition H. The domains
whose connectivity graphs are shown in diagrams (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), are linked.
The domains corresponding to (b), (c) and (d) satisfy Condition H, while domains
related to (e) and (f) violate it. In diagram (b), any alternative can be a hub; in
diagram (c) it must be either a1 or a2, while in diagram (d) the only candidate for
the hub is a2. Observe that in diagrams (e) and (f) for any two alternatives, they are
either connected or connected to a common alternative.
Our main result in this subsection is that the assumption of a linked domain in con-
junction with Condition H ensures that the domain is a random dictatorship domain.
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Theorem 4 A linked domain satisfying Condition H is a random dictatorship domain.
Proof: Let D be a linked domain satisfying Condition H. In particular, let ak be a
hub. Since a linked domain satisfies the triple property, Theorem 3 applies. In order
to prove the theorem, it suffices therefore to show that every strategy-proof RSCF
ϕ : D2 → L(A) satisfying unanimity, is a random dictatorship. Assume without loss of
generality that I = {i, j}.
Lemma 1 There exists a function σ : {1, 2, . . . ,m} → {1, 2, . . . ,m} for domain D as
specified in Definition 10 with ak = aσ(1).
Proof: Suppose not, i.e., for every function σˆ satisfying Definition 10, we have ak 6=
aσˆ(1). Suppose there exists σ satisfying Definition 10 with ak ∈ {aσ(2), aσ(3)}. Assume
without loss of generality that ak = aσ(2). Now permute elements in A such that
aσ(2) is re-labeled aσ(1), while aσ(1) is re-labeled as aσ(2), while keeping all other labels
intact. This creates another function σ′ satisfying Definition 10 but ak = aσ′(1). This
contradicts our earlier assumption.
Now, suppose σˆ satisfying Definition 10 is such that ak = aσˆ(k∗) with k
∗ > 3. Define
a new function: σ(1) = σˆ(k∗), σ(s) = σˆ(s − 1), for all 2 ≤ s ≤ k∗ and σ(t) = σˆ(t)
for all k∗ + 1 ≤ t ≤ m. According to Condition H, aσ(2) = aσˆ(1) ∼ aσˆ(k∗) = aσ(1) and
aσ(3) = aσˆ(2) ∼ aσˆ(k∗) = aσ(1). Meanwhile, by σˆ, aσ(3) = aσˆ(2) ∼ aσˆ(1) = aσ(2). Thus we
have aσ(1), aσ(2), aσ(3) form a triple of connectedness. Next, according to σˆ, we know
that for all 3 ≤ j ≤ k∗ − 1, aσˆ(j) is linked to {aσˆ(1), . . . , aσˆ(j−1)}. Meanwhile, since
aσˆ(j) = aσ(j+1) and {aσˆ(1), . . . , aσˆ(j−1)} = {aσ(2), . . . , aσ(j)} ⊂ {aσ(1), aσ(2), . . . , aσ(j)},
we know that aσ(j+1) is linked to {aσ(1), aσ(2), . . . , aσ(j)}. Similarly, for all k∗ ≤ j ≤
m, aσˆ(j+1) = aσ(j+1), aσˆ(j+1) is linked to {aσˆ(1), . . . , aσˆ(j)} and {aσˆ(1), . . . , aσˆ(j)} =
{aσˆ(1), . . . , aσˆ(k∗−1), aσˆ(k∗), aσˆ(k∗+1), . . . , aσˆ(j)} = {aσ(2), . . . , aσ(k∗), aσ(1), aσ(k∗+1), . . . , aσ(j)} =
{aσ(1), . . . , aσ(j)}. Therefore, aσ(j+1) is linked to {aσ(1), . . . , aσ(j)}. Hence σ satisfies
Definition 10, contradicting our initial assumption once again.
Assume for simplicity that the function in Definition 10 is the identity function.
It follows from Lemma 1 that the hub is a1. Define Sl = {a1, . . . , al}, l = 3, . . . ,m.
Clearly, a1 ∈ Sl for all l. Our proof consists in establishing two steps.
Step 1. There exists ε ∈ [0, 1] such that for all Pi, Pj ∈ DS3 , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) +
(1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Step 2. If for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl−1 , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1 − ε)eb(r1(Pj)), then
for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
The following lemma establishes Step 1.
Lemma 2 There exists ε ∈ [0, 1] such that for all Pi, Pj ∈ DS3, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi))+
(1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Proof: Since a1, a2, a3 form a triple of connectedness, the lemma follows from Theorem
2 in Sen (2011).
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To verify Step 2, we use the following induction hypothesis: for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl−1 ,
l > 3, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)). We will show that for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1 − ε)eb(r1(Pj)). Since D is linked and a1 is a hub, we know
that there exists ak ∈ Sl−1 such that al ∼ ak, ak ∼ a1 and al ∼ a1, forming a triple of
connectedness. The next 3 lemmas explain the verification of Step 2.
Lemma 3 For all Pi, Pj ∈ D{a1,ak,al}, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Proof: Since al, ak, a1 form a triple of connectedness, applying Theorem 2 in Sen (2011),
we infer that there exists β ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = β eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− β)eb(r1(Pj))
for all Pi, Pj ∈ D{a1,ak,al}.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj))
for all Pi, Pj ∈ D{a1,ak}. Therefore, ε = β.
For the next lemma, pick any aj ∈ Sl−1\{a1, ak}. Since al ∼ a1 and aj ∼ a1 (by
Condition H), we have P ∗i ∈ Dal,a1 and P ∗j ∈ Daj ,a1 .
Lemma 4 ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = ε and ϕaj (P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = 1− ε.
Proof: We consider two cases.
Firstly, suppose that ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = β and ϕaj (P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = 1− β. Since there exists
P ′i ∈ Da1,al (recall a1 ∼ al), strategy-proofness and the induction hypothesis imply
that β = ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) + ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = ϕal(P
′
i , P
∗
j ) + ϕa1(P
′
i , P
∗
j ) =
ϕa1(P
′
i , P
∗
j ) = ε.
Second, suppose that ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) + ϕaj (P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) < 1. Since there exist P
′
i ∈ Da1,al
and P ′j ∈ Da1,aj (by Condition H), strategy-proofness, the induction hypothesis and
Lemma 3 imply that ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) + ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = ϕal(P
′
i , P
∗
j ) + ϕa1(P
′
i , P
∗
j ) = ε and
ϕaj (P
∗
i , P
∗
j )+ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = ϕaj (P
∗
i , P
′
j)+ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
′
j) = 1−ε. Therefore, it must be the
case that ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) > 0. Assume that ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = α > 0. Then, ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) =
ε − α, ϕaj (P ∗i , P ∗j ) = 1 − ε − α and
∑
at /∈{a1,aj ,al} ϕat(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = α. This implies that
there exists ai ∈ A\{a1, aj , al} such that ϕai(P ∗i , P ∗j ) > 0.
By Condition H, there exists Pk ∈ Da1,ai . Let s, s′ be such that al = rs(Pk) and
aj = rs′(Pk). We need to consider two cases.
Case 1: s < s′.
Let P¯i = Pk. By the induction hypothesis, ϕ(P¯i, P
∗
j ) = ε e1 + (1 − ε)ej . Then,∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P¯i)(P¯i, P
∗
j ) = ε < ϕa1(P
∗
i , P
∗
j )+ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j )+ϕai(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) ≤
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P¯i)(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ).
Therefore, voter i manipulates at (P¯i, P
∗
j ) via P
∗
i .
Case 2: s > s′.
Let P¯j = Pk. By Lemma 3, ϕ(P
∗
i , P¯j) = ε el+(1−ε)e1. Then,
∑s′
k=1 ϕrk(P¯j)(P
∗
i , P¯j) =
1 − ε < ϕa1(P ∗i , P ∗j ) + ϕaj (P ∗i , P ∗j ) + ϕai(P ∗i , P ∗j ) ≤
∑s′
k=1 ϕrk(P¯j)(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ). Therefore,
voter j manipulates at (P ∗i , P¯j) via P
∗
j .
Summing up, we conclude that manipulation always occurs when α > 0. This
establishes the Lemma.
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Lemma 5 (i) For all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ DSl, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
(ii) For all Pi ∈ DSl and Pj ∈ Dal, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)el.
Proof: We verify part (i) first. Let aj ∈ Sl−1\{a1, ak}, Pj ∈ Daj , P ∗i ∈ Dal,a1 and
P ∗j ∈ Daj ,a1 . Strategy-proofness and Lemma 4 imply ϕaj (P ∗i , Pj) = ϕaj (P ∗i , P ∗j ) =
1 − ε and 1 − ε = ϕaj (P ∗i , P ∗j ) + ϕa1(P ∗i , P ∗j ) ≥ ϕaj (P ∗i , Pj) + ϕa1(P ∗i , Pj). Therefore,
ϕa1(P
∗
i , Pj) = 0.
Next, consider Pi ∈ Dal and P ′i ∈ Da1,al . By strategy-proofness and the induction
hypothesis, ϕal(Pi, Pj) = ϕal(P
∗
i , Pj) = ϕal(P
∗
i , Pj) + ϕa1(P
∗
i , Pj) = ϕal(P
′
i , Pj) +
ϕa1(P
′
i , Pj) = ϕa1(P
′
i , Pj) = ε.
Similarly, for all Pi ∈ Dal , we have ϕa1(Pi, P ∗j ) = 0. Let P ′j ∈ Da1,aj . Strategy-
proofness and Lemma 3 imply ϕaj (Pi, Pj) = ϕaj (Pi, P
∗
j ) = ϕaj (Pi, P
∗
j ) +ϕa1(Pi, P
∗
j ) =
ϕaj (Pi, P
′
j) + ϕa1(Pi, P
′
j) = ϕa1(Pi, P
′
j) = 1− ε.
Therefore, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = εel + (1 − ε)ej for all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ Daj where aj ∈
Sl−1\{a1, ak}. By unanimity and Lemma 3, we conclude that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el + (1 −
ε)eb(r1(Pj)) for all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ DSl .
The proof of part (ii) is the symmetric counterpart of the proof of part (i) and is
therefore omitted.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we have proved that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi))+
(1−ε)eb(r1(Pj)) for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl . This completes the verification of Step 2 and hence
the proof of the theorem.
We observe that Condition H is a strong condition and imposing it on the connec-
tivity graph of a linked domain constitutes a significant strengthening of the linked
domain condition. We note some implications of Theorem 4 below.
Remark 4 The Free Pair at the Top domain (FPT domain) (Aswal et al. (2003)) in
which every two alternatives are connected, is a linked domain satisfying Condition H
(any alternative could be a hub) and is consequently a random dictatorship domain.
This partially addresses an open question in Sen (2011): is the FPT domain a random
dictatorship domain for any arbitrary number of voter greater than two?
Remark 5 It was noted in Aswal et al. (2003) that the minimal cardinality of a linked
domain is 4m− 6. It is also possible to construct a linked domain satisfying Condition
H of the same cardinality. This can be done as follows: a1 ∼ a2, a2 ∼ a3, a1 ∼ a3
and aj ∼ a1, aj ∼ a2 for all j = 4, . . . ,m. We can therefore find “small” random
dictatorship domains - those that grow linearly in the number of alternatives.
5.2 Strongly Linked Domains with Condition TS
In this subsection we provide another condition that ensures that a domain is a random
dictatorship domain. Our approach here is to strengthen the notion of connectedness
of alternatives along the lines initiated in Chatterji et al. (2010).
14
Definition 16 A pair of alternatives a, b is strongly connected (denoted by a ≈ b) if
there exist Pi, P
′
i ∈ D such that
(i) r1(Pi) = a and r2(Pi) = b,
(ii) r1(P
′
i ) = b and r2(P
′
i ) = a,
(iii) rk(Pi) = rk(P
′
i ), k = 3, . . . ,m.
In other words, a and b are stongly connected if it is possible to find an ordering in
the domain where a and b are first and second ranked and it is possible to flip a and b
while keeping the position of all other alternatives fixed.
Definition 17 A strongly linked domain is defined in exactly the same way as a linked
domain except that the notion of connectedness is replaced by strong connectedness.
A strongly linked domain has stronger restrictions embedded in it than a linked
domain. However, they are not necessarily randomly dictatorial. This is easily seen
from domain DL in Section 3.1 - the domain described in Appendix A can be specified
to be strongly linked. An additional condition needs to be imposed to make a strongly
linked domain a random dictatorship domain.
Definition 18 A domain satisfies Condition TS if for all a, b ∈ A, either a ≈ b, or
there exists c ∈ A such that a ≈ c and b ≈ c.
In other words, every alternative is strongly connected to any other alternative in at
most two steps. The counterpart of this condition for connectedness is clearly weaker
than Condition H. If the graphs in Figure 2 (e) and (f) are interpreted in terms of
strong connectedness, then they represent strongly linked domains satisfying Condition
TS.
Theorem 5 A strongly linked domain satisfying Condition TS is a random dictator-
ship domain.
Proof: Let D be a strongly linked domain satisfying Condition TS. Since domain
D satisfies the triple property (the strong connectedness implies the connectedness),
it suffices as in Theorem 4 to show that every strategy-proof and unanimous RSCF
ϕ : D2 → L(A) is a random dictatorship. Let I = {i, j}. For notational simplicity,
we assume that the function σ in Definition 17 is the identity function. Define Sl =
{a1, a2, . . . , al}, l = 3, . . . ,m. Our proof proceeds by establishing the same two steps
as those in the proof of Theorem 4.
Step 1. There exists ε ∈ [0, 1] such that for all Pi, Pj ∈ DS3 , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) +
(1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Step 2. If for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl−1 , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1 − ε)eb(r1(Pj)), then
for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
The following lemma establishes Step 1.
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Lemma 6 There exists ε ∈ [0, 1] such that for all Pi, Pj ∈ DS3, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi))+
(1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Proof: Since a1, a2, a3 form a triple of strong connectedness, which implies the triple
of connectedness, the lemma follows from Theorem 2 in Sen (2011).
To verify Step 2, we use the following induction hypothesis.
Induction Hypothesis Level 1: for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl−1 , l > 3, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) +
(1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
We will show that for all Pi, Pj ∈ DSl , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Pick an arbitrary l > 3 and a ∈ Sl−1. We say that al is strongly connected to a
by a chain of length t located in Sl if there exists a sequence {yk}t+2k=1 ⊂ Sl of length
t + 2 such that al = y1, a = yt+2 and yk ≈ yk+1, k = 1, . . . , t + 1. We let Tt(al, Sl)
denote the set of the alternatives a ∈ Sl−1 satisfying the following two properties: (i)
a is strongly connected to al by a chain of length t located in Sl and (ii) there does not
exist a chain of length strictly less than t located in Sl connecting al and a.
5
It is evident that Ts(al, Sl)∩Ts′(al, Sl) = ∅ whenever s 6= s′. Moreover, it also follows
that (i) Ts(al, Sl) = ∅ implies that Ts′(al, Sl) = ∅ for all s′ > s, (ii) ∪t≥0Tt(al, Sl) = Sl−1
and (iii) if a ∈ Ts(al, Sl) with s > 0, there exists b ∈ Ts−1(al, Sl) such that b ≈ a. The
next lemma considers T0(al, Sl).
Lemma 7 (i) For all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ DT0(al,Sl), ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el+(1−ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
(ii) For all Pi ∈ DT0(al,Sl) and Pj ∈ Dal, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)el.
Proof: We show part (i) first. Let as ∈ T0(al, Sl). Since al ∼ as (recall that [al ≈
as] ⇒ [al ∼ as]), Lemmas 1 and 2 in Sen (2011) imply that for all Pi ∈ Dal and
Pj ∈ Das , there exists β ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = β el + (1 − β)es. Now, pick
at ∈ T0(al, Sl)\{as},6 P¯i ∈ Dal,at , P¯ ∗i ∈ Dat,al and Pj ∈ Das . Strategy-proofness
and Level 1 induction hypothesis imply β = ϕal(P¯i, Pj) = ϕal(P¯i, Pj) + ϕat(P¯i, Pj) =
ϕal(P¯
∗
i , Pj) + ϕat(P¯
∗
i , Pj) = ϕat(P¯
∗
i , Pj) = ε. By symmetric arguments, part (ii) also
holds.
To exhaust all alternatives in Sl−1, we provide another induction hypothesis as
follows.
Induction Hypothesis Level 2: Fix an arbitrary l ≤ m. Suppose that for all 0 ≤ t′ < t
and either Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ D∪t
′
k=0Tk(al,Sl) or Pi ∈ D∪t
′
k=0Tk(al,Sl) and Pj ∈ Dal , we have
that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
We will show that for all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ DTt(al,Sl), or Pi ∈ DTt(al,Sl) and Pj ∈ Dal ,
we have ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
5We use an example to explain the chain. Let Figure 2 (e) denote a strong connectivity graph of a
strongly linked domain. Let the one to one function σ be the identity function. Considering a1 and a5, then
{a5, a3, a2, a4, a1}, {a5, a3, a2, a1} and {a5, a3, a1} are chains of length 3, 2 and 1 located in S5 respectively.
Meanwhile, T0(a5, S5) = {a3, a4}, T1(a5, S5) = {a1, a2} and Tt(a5, S5) = ∅ for all t ≥ 2.
6Definition of strongly linked domains (Definition 17) implies that |T0(al, Sl)| ≥ 2.
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Lemma 8 (i) For all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ DTt(al,Sl), ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el+(1−ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
(ii) For all Pi ∈ DTt(al,Sl) and Pj ∈ Dal, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)el.
Proof: Pick aj ∈ Tt(al, Sl) with t > 0. According to Condition TS, there exists ai ∈ A
such that ai ≈ al and ai ≈ aj . There are two cases to consider: ai ∈ Sl−1 and
ai /∈ Sl−1.7 The proof of Lemma 8 follows the following 6 claims. We verify part (i)
first. Claim 1 below consider ai ∈ Sl−1.
Claim 1: (i) For all Pi ∈ D{al,aj} 8 and Pj ∈ Dai , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)ei.
(ii) For all Pi ∈ Dai and Pj ∈ D{al,aj}, ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε ei + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)).
Since ai ∈ Sl−1, it must be the case that ai ∈ T0(al, Sl) and aj ∈ T1(al, Sl). The
claim then follows from Lemma 7 and the Level 1 induction hypothesis. This completes
the verification of Claim 1.
Next, we will show that the same conclusions hold when ai /∈ Sl−1. Now, it must be
the case that aj ∈ Tt(al, Sl) where t > 1. Since ai /∈ Sl−1, we can assume that al ≈ as,
where as ∈ T0(al, Sl) (by Definition 17) and aj ≈ ak, where ak ∈ Tt−1(al, Sl), t > 1
(by property (iii) of Tt(al, Sl) above). Since t > 1, it is evident that as 6= ak. The next
three claims assume that ai /∈ Sl−1.
Claim 2: (i) For some P¯i ∈ Dal,as and P¯j ∈ Daj ,ak , ϕ(P¯i, P¯j) = ε el + (1− ε)ej .
(ii) For some P¯i ∈ Daj ,ak and P¯j ∈ Dal,as , ϕ(P¯i, P¯j) = ε ej + (1− ε)el.
We first consider part (i). By strong connectedness, we can assume that there
exist P ′i ∈ Das,al and P ′j ∈ Dak,aj such that rν(P ′i ) = rν(P¯i) and rν(P ′j) = rν(P¯j),
ν = 3, . . . ,m. Now, since as, aj ∈ Sl−1, by strategy-proofness and the Level 1 induc-
tion hypothesis, we have that ϕal(P¯i, P¯j) + ϕas(P¯i, P¯j) = ϕal(P
′
i , P¯j) + ϕas(P
′
i , P¯j) =
ϕas(P
′
i , P¯j) = ε. Similarly, since ak ∈ Tt−1(al, Sl), by strategy-proofness and the
Level 2 induction hypothesis, we have that ϕaj (P¯i, P¯j) + ϕak(P¯i, P¯j) = ϕaj (P¯i, P
′
j) +
ϕak(P¯i, P
′
j) = ϕaj (P¯i, P
′
j) = 1− ε. Therefore, for all a /∈ {al, aj , as, ak}, ϕa(P¯i, P¯j) = 0.
Suppose ϕas(P¯i, P¯j) = α > 0. Then, ϕal(P¯i, P¯j) = ε− α. Assume al = rk1(P¯j) and
as = rk2(P¯j). Then, al = rk1(P
′
j) and as = rk2(P
′
j). We have two cases.
Case 1: k1 < k2.
Fix Pj ∈ Dal . By unanimity, ϕal(P¯i, Pj) = 1. Hence,
∑k1
ν=1 ϕrν(P¯j)(P¯i, P¯j) =
ϕaj (P¯i, P¯j) + ϕak(P¯i, P¯j) + ϕal(P¯i, P¯j) = 1 − α <
∑k1
ν=1 ϕrν(P¯j)(P¯i, Pj). Then, voter j
would manipulate at (P¯i, P¯j) via Pj .
Case 2: k1 > k2.
7We provide an example to show both cases of ai ∈ Sl−1 and ai /∈ Sl−1. Let Figure 2 (f) denote the strong
connectivity graph of a strongly linked domain. Then, the domain satisfies Condition TS. Furthermore, it
is true that for every one to one function σ : {1, . . . , 7} → {1, . . . , 7} satisfied by a domain in Definition 17,
a7 = aσ(7). Let function σ be the identity function. We first consider a1, a5 and S4. We know that a1 ≈ a3,
a3 ≈ a5 and a3 ∈ S4. Next, considering a1, a6 and S5, we know that a1 ≈ a7, a7 ≈ a6 and a7 /∈ S5.
8Recall that D{al,aj} is different from Dal,aj . In the following proof, we never use Dal,aj , for we have no
idea on whether Dal,aj = ∅ or not.
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By the Level 2 induction hypothesis,
∑k2
ν=1 ϕrν(P ′j)(P¯i, P
′
j) = ϕak(P¯i, P
′
j) = 1− ε <
1− ε+α = ϕaj (P¯i, P¯j) +ϕak(P¯i, P¯j) +ϕas(P¯i, P¯j) =
∑k2
ν=1 ϕrν(P ′j)(P¯i, P¯j). Then, voter
j would manipulate at (P¯i, P
′
j) via P¯j .
Now, ϕas(P¯i, P¯j) = 0. Next, suppose that ϕak(P¯i, P¯j) = α > 0. Then, ϕaj (P¯i, P¯j) =
1− ε−α. Assume aj = rt1(P¯i) and ak = rt2(P¯i). Then, aj = rt1(P ′i ) and ak = rt2(P ′i ).
We have two cases.
Case 1: t1 < t2.
Fix Pi ∈ Daj . By unanimity, ϕaj (Pi, P¯j) = 1. Hence,
∑t1
ν=1 ϕrν(P¯i)(P¯i, P¯j) =
ϕal(P¯i, P¯j) + ϕas(P¯i, P¯j) + ϕaj (P¯i, P¯j) = 1 − α <
∑t1
ν=1 ϕrν(P¯i)(Pi, P¯j). Then, voter i
would manipulate at (P¯i, P¯j) via Pi.
Case 2: t1 > t2.
By the Level 1 induction hypothesis,
∑t2
ν=1 ϕrν(P ′i )(P
′
i , P¯j) = ϕas(P
′
i , P¯j) = ε <
ε + α = ϕal(P¯i, P¯j) + ϕas(P¯i, P¯j) + ϕak(P¯i, P¯j) =
∑t2
ν=1 ϕrν(P ′i )(P¯i, P¯j). Then, voter i
would manipulate at (P ′i , P¯j) via P¯i.
Then, ϕak(P¯i, P¯j) = 0. Therefore, ϕ(P¯i, P¯j) = ε el + (1− ε)ej .
By symmetric arguments, part (ii) also holds. This completes the verification of
Claim 2.
Claim 3: (i) For all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ Dai , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el + (1− ε)ei.
(ii) For all Pi ∈ Dai and Pj ∈ Dal , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε ei + (1− ε)el.
We first consider part (i). Since al ∼ ai (recall [al ≈ ai] ⇒ [al ∼ ai]), Lemmas 1
and 2 in Sen (2011) imply that there exists β ∈ [0, 1] such that for all Pi ∈ Dal and
Pj ∈ Dai , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = β el + (1− β)ei.
Next, fix P¯i ∈ Dal,as , P¯j ∈ Daj ,ak , where profile (P¯i, P¯j) satisfies Claim 2 (i),
P ∗i ∈ Das,al and P ∗j ∈ Daj ,ai . Since as, aj ∈ Sl−1, by strategy-proofness and the Level 1
induction hypothesis, we have ϕal(P¯i, P
∗
j )+ϕas(P¯i, P
∗
j ) = ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j )+ϕas(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) =
ϕas(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = ε. Meanwhile, by strategy-proofness and Claim 2 (i), ϕaj (P¯i, P
∗
j ) =
ϕaj (P¯i, P¯j) = 1 − ε. Therefore, ϕai(P¯i, P ∗j ) = 0. Now, fix P¯ ∗j ∈ Dai,aj . Strategy-
proofness implies 1 − β = ϕai(P¯i, P¯ ∗j ) = ϕai(P¯i, P¯ ∗j ) + ϕaj (P¯i, P¯ ∗j ) = ϕai(P¯i, P ∗j ) +
ϕaj (P¯i, P
∗
j ) = ϕaj (P¯i, P
∗
j ) = 1− ε. Therefore, β = ε.
In conclusion, for all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ Dai , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el + (1− ε)ei.
By symmetric arguments, we have that for all Pi ∈ Dai and Pj ∈ Dal , ϕ(Pi, Pj) =
ε ei + (1− ε)el. This completes the verification of Claim 3.
Claim 4: (i) For all Pi ∈ Daj and Pj ∈ Dai , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε ej + (1− ε)ei.
(ii) For all Pi ∈ Dai and Pj ∈ Daj , ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε ei + (1− ε)ej .
This Claim is similar to Claim 3 but its proof follows from Claim 2 and the Level
2 induction hypothesis while the proof for Claim 3 follows from Claim 2 and the Level
1 induction hypothesis. This completes the verification of Claim 4.
We have shown that irrespective of whether ai ∈ Sl−1 or ai /∈ Sl−1, ϕ(Pi, Pj) =
ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1 − ε)eb(r1(Pj)) holds for all Pi ∈ D{al,aj} and Pj ∈ Dai or Pi ∈ Dai and
Pj ∈ D{al,aj}.
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For next claim, let P ∗i ∈ Dal,ai and P ∗j ∈ Daj ,ai .
Claim 5: ϕ(P ∗i , P
∗
j ) = ε el + (1− ε)ej .
Suppose that the Claim is false. Similar to Lemma 4, we can assume that ϕai(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) =
α > 0. Since al ≈ ai and aj ≈ ai, we can assume that there exist P¯ ∗i ∈ Dai,al and
P¯ ∗j ∈ Dai,aj such that rk(P¯ ∗j ) = rk(P ∗j ), k = 3, . . . ,m. Since Claims 1, 3 (i) and 4 (ii)
imply that ϕai(P
∗
i , P¯
∗
j ) + ϕaj (P
∗
i , P¯
∗
j ) = 1 − ε and ϕai(P¯ ∗i , P ∗j ) + ϕal(P¯ ∗i , P ∗j ) = ε, by
strategy-proofness, we have that ϕaj (P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = 1 − ε − α and ϕal(P ∗i , P ∗j ) = ε − α.
Assume al = rs(P
∗
j ). It is evident that s ≥ 3. Then, strong connectedness implies that
al = rs(P¯
∗
j ). According to Claims 1 and 3 (i),
∑s−1
k=1 ϕrk(P¯ ∗j )
(P ∗i , P¯
∗
j ) = 1− ε. Next, by
strong connectedness, we know that {rk(P ∗j )}s−1k=1 = {rk(P¯ ∗j )}s−1k=1. Hence, by strategy-
proofness, we have that
∑s−1
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗j )(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) =
∑s−1
k=1 ϕrk(P¯ ∗j )
(P ∗i , P¯
∗
j ) = 1−ε. There-
fore,
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗j )(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) =
∑s−1
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗j )(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) + ϕal(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = 1 − α. Now,
fix Pj ∈ Dal . By unanimity,
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗j )(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) = 1 − α < 1 = ϕal(P ∗i , Pj) =∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗j )(P
∗
i , Pj). Therefore voter j manipulates at (P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) via Pj . This com-
pletes the verification of Claim 5.
Claim 6: For all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ Daj , we have ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε el + (1− ε)ej .
The proof of this claim follows from Lemma 5.9
By symmetric arguments, it follows that ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε ej + (1− ε)el for all Pi ∈ Daj
and Pj ∈ Dal . This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
We can now complete the proof of the Theorem. We have shown that under the
Level 1 induction hypothesis, the Level 2 induction hypothesis is established. With
unanimity, this implies that for all Pi ∈ Dal and Pj ∈ DSl , or Pi ∈ DSl and Pj ∈ Dal ,
we have ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)) as required, to complete Step 2.
Remark 6 It is easy to construct domains that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4
but not of Theorem 5. The key step in such a construction is to make the notions of
connectedness and strong connectedness equivalent; i.e., whenever a ∼ b, we also have
a ≈ b for all a, b ∈ A. In this setting, Condition TS is weaker than Condition H as is
illustrated by the connectivity graphs in Figure 2 (e) and (f).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that dictatorial domains are not necessarily random dic-
tatorship domains. We have provided additional conditions on a class of dictatorial
domains to ensure that they are random dictatorship domains. These additional con-
ditions are quite restrictive and they suggest that a large class of dictatorial domains
admit strategy-proof random social choice functions satisfying unanimity that are not
random dictatorships.
9In the verification of Claim 6, we only need the conditions that al ∼ ai and aj ∼ ai, which are implied
by the strong connectedness. Furthermore, in the proof of Lemma 5, we do not apply the full property of
the hub a1 (the hub is connected to every alternative else). Therefore, we could apply the same argument
of Lemma 5 to the verification of Claim 6.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Domain DL
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4 a4 a4 a4 a5 a5 a5 a5 a6 a6 a6 a7 a7 a7 a7
a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a1 a4 a1 a3 a5 a7 a1 a4 a6 a7 a2 a5 a7 a2 a4 a5 a6
· a2 a2 · · · a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 · a2 a2 · a2 a2 a2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
a2 · · · · a2 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table 1: Domain DL
In the table above, dots on a particular ordering signify that alternatives not spec-
ified are arbitrarily ordered.
Appendix B: The Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: It suffices to construct a unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial RSCF
ϕ : D2NRD → L(A). Let I = {i, j}. Similar to the RSCF in the proof of Proposition 1,
consider the RSCF ϕ below:
ϕ(Pi, Pj) =
{
ε eb(x) + α eb(r2(Pj)) + (1− ε− α)eb(y) if Pi ∈ DxNRD and Pj ∈ DyNRD
ε eb(r1(Pi)) + (1− ε)eb(r1(Pj)) otherwise.
where 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < α ≤ min(ε, 1− ε).
It is evident that RSCF ϕ is unanimous and not a random dictatorship. To check
the strategy-proofness of ϕ, it suffices to consider only the five cased below.
Case 1: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pj ∈ DyNRD and Pi /∈ DxNRD. Voter i considers a
manipulation via P ′i ∈ DxNRD.
Let u ∈ U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi, Pj) − Ui(P ′i , Pj) =
εu(r1(Pi))+αu(y)−εu(x)−αu(r2(Pj)). If yPir2(Pj), then Ui(Pi, Pj)−Ui(P ′i , Pj) ≥
0. Suppose r2(Pj)Piy. Then Pi /∈ DyNRD, which implies that Pi ∈ DA\{x,y}NRD . Since
r2(Pj) ∈ S(y), applying the third restriction of the Condition NRD, we have
Ui(Pi, Pj)− Ui(P ′i , Pj) = ε
[
u(r1(Pi))− u(r2(Pj))
]
+ (ε− α)
[
u(r2(Pj))− u(y)
]
−
ε
[
u(y)− u(x)
]
≥ 0.
Case 2: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pj ∈ DyNRD and Pi ∈ DxNRD. Voter i considers a
manipulation via P ′i /∈ DxNRD.
Let u ∈ U(Pi). Since Pi ∈ DxNRD, r2(Pj)Piy by the second restriction of the Con-
dition NRD. Hence, the loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi, Pj) − Ui(P ′i , Pj) =
ε
[
u(x)− u(r1(P ′i ))
]
+ α
[
u(r2(Pj))− u(y)
]
≥ 0.
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Case 3: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pi ∈ DxNRD and Pj /∈ DyNRD. Voter j considers a
manipulation via P ′j ∈ DyNRD.
Let u ∈ U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi, Pj) − Uj(Pi, P ′j) =
(1− ε− α)
[
u(r1(Pj))− u(y)
]
+ α
[
u(r1(Pj))− u(r2(P ′j))
]
≥ 0.
Case 4: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pi ∈ DxNRD and Pj ∈ DyNRD. Voter j considers a
manipulation via P ′j /∈ DyNRD.
Let u ∈ U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi, Pj) − Uj(Pi, P ′j) =
(1− ε− α)
[
u(y)− u(r1(P ′j))
]
+ α
[
u(r2(Pj))− u(r1(P ′j))
]
≥ 0.
Case 5: The profile is (Pi, Pj) where Pi ∈ DxNRD and Pj ∈ DyNRD. Voter j considers a
manipulation via P ′j ∈ DyNRD and P ′j 6= Pj .
Let u ∈ U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi, Pj) − Uj(Pi, P ′j) =
α
[
u(r2(Pj))− u(r2(P ′j))
]
≥ 0.
We conclude that RSCF ϕ is strategy-proof.
Appendix C: The Proof of Theorem 3
In this section we provide a proof of Theorem 3. In fact, we prove a stronger version
of the Theorem by using a weaker but slightly more complicated condition than the
triple property. We begin by describing this condition.
For an ordering Pi ∈ D and a ∈ A, we let B(Pi, a) denote the set of alternatives
that are strictly better than a according to Pi, i.e., [x ∈ B(Pi, a)] ⇒ [xPia], while
W (Pi, a) denotes the set of alternatives that are strictly worse than a according to
Pi, i.e., [x ∈ W (Pi, a)] ⇒ [aPix]. For a profile P ∈ DN , let τ(P ) = {r1(Pi)}Ni=1.
For any i ∈ I and profile P ∈ DN , τ(P−i) denotes the set of alternatives that are
first-ranked by all voters other than i. For a profile P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , define
W (P ) = ∪Ni=1W
(
Pi,max(Pi, τ(P−i))
)
.
Definition 19 A domain D satisfies Richness Condition α if there exist P1, P2, P3 ∈ D
with |τ(P1, P2, P3)| = 3 such that W (P1, P2, P3) = A.
If domain D satisfies the triple property, there exist alternatives a, b and c, and
orderings P1, P2 and P3 such that r1(P1) = a, r2(P1) = b, r1(P2) = b, r2(P2) = c,
r1(P3) = c and r2(P3) = a. The orderings P1, P2 and P3 satisfy Richness Condition α.
Henceforth, we assume that domain D satisfies Minimal Richness (Definition 14)
and Richness Condition α.
An additional piece of notation that we shall be using throughout the proof is the
following: for all a, b ∈ A, I(a, b) is the indicator function where I(a, b) = 1 if a = b
and I(a, b) = 0 if a 6= b.
The following definition serves as a critical bridge in the proof of Theorem 3.
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Definition 20 A unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is a quasi-
random dictatorship, if there exists {εk}Nk=1 ≥ 0 with
∑N
k=1 εk = 1 such that for all
P ∈ DN , where there exist i, j ∈ I that Pi = Pj, ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)).
The random dictatorship is stronger than quasi-random dictatorship, for quasi-
random dictatorship only considers those profiles of preferences with at least two voters
sharing a same preference ordering and the outcome under such a profile of preferences
is a convex combination of N (deterministic) dictatorial social choice functions with
respect to an N -dimensional sequence {εk}Nk=1.
The proof of (b) ⇒ (a) in Theorem 3 is trivial. We focus on showing (a) ⇒ (b).
The proof consists in establishing three steps. Following is the outline of the proof.
Step 1. Suppose domain D satisfies Richness Condition α. Every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF g : D2 → L(A) is a random dictatorship ⇒ every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : D3 → L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship. This is shown in
Proposition 4. 
Step 2. Every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF g : DN−1 → L(A), N > 3, is a
random dictatorship ⇒ every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is
a quasi-random dictatorship. This is shown in Proposition 5. 
Step 3. Suppose for all 2 ≤ t < N , every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF
g : Dt → L(A), is a random dictatorship. A unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF
ϕ : DN → L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship ⇒ ϕ is a random dictatorship. This is
shown in Proposition 6. 
Note that we only use Richness Condition α in the verification of Step 1. Thus the
induction problem is solved in the way shown by the arrows in the diagram below.
Number of voters 2 3 4 . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . .N − 1 N
Quasi−Random Dictatorship
RandomDictatorship Domain q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q


>
?

>
?

> 3 3 3
? ?
Proposition 4 Let D be a minimally rich domain satisfying Richness Condition α.
Suppose every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF g : D2 → L(A) is a random dicta-
torship. Then every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : D3 → L(A) is a quasi-
random dictatorship.
Proof: Define three RSCF’s as follows: g(2,3)(P1, P2) = ϕ(P1, P2, P2), g
(1,3)(P1, P2) =
ϕ(P1, P2, P1) and g
(1,2)(P1, P3) = ϕ(P1, P1, P3) for all P1, P2, P3 ∈ D. According to
Lemma 3 in Sen (2011), we know that RSCF’s g(2,3), g(1,3) and g(1,2) are random
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dictatorships. Then, there exist ε1, ε2, ε3 ≥ 0 such that for all P1, P2, P3 ∈ D,
ϕ(P1, P2, P2) = ε1 eb(r1(P1)) + (1− ε1)eb(r1(P2))
ϕ(P1, P2, P1) = (1− ε2)eb(r1(P1)) + ε2 eb(r1(P2))
ϕ(P1, P1, P3) = (1− ε3)eb(r1(P1)) + ε3 eb(r1(P3))
To establish that ϕ is a quasi-random dictatorship, it suffices to show that ε1 +ε2 +
ε3 = 1. Now, fix a profile P
∗ = (P ∗1 , P ∗2 , P ∗3 ), satisfying Richness Condition α. Since
W (P ∗) = A implies that τ(P ∗) ⊂ W (P ∗), we could assume without loss of generality
that r1(P
∗
1 ) = a, r1(P
∗
2 ) = b, r1(P
∗
3 ) = c, b P
∗
1 c, c P
∗
2 a and aP
∗
3 b. Furthermore, assume
b = rs(P
∗
1 ) and c = rs′(P
∗
1 ). Hence, 1 < s < s
′. By strategy-proofness, we know that for
all t ≥ 1, ∑tk=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P ∗2 , P ∗2 , P ∗3 ) ≤ ∑tk=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P ∗) ≤ ∑tk=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P ∗1 , P ∗1 , P ∗3 ).
Since ϕ(P ∗2 , P ∗2 , P ∗3 ) = g(1,2)(P ∗2 , P ∗3 ) and ϕ(P ∗1 , P ∗1 , P ∗3 ) = g(1,2)(P ∗1 , P ∗3 ), we have that
for all t ≥ 1, ∑tk=1 g(1,2)rk(P ∗1 )(P ∗2 , P ∗3 ) ≤∑tk=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P ∗) ≤∑tk=1 g(1,2)rk(P ∗1 )(P ∗1 , P ∗3 ).
Next, since g(1,2) is a random dictatorship with respect to {1− ε3, ε3}, we have
s∑
k=1
g
(1,2)
rk(P
∗
1 )
(P ∗2 , P
∗
3 ) =
s′−1∑
k=1
g
(1,2)
rk(P
∗
1 )
(P ∗2 , P
∗
3 ) = g
(1,2)
b (P
∗
2 , P
∗
3 ) = 1− ε3
s∑
k=1
g
(1,2)
rk(P
∗
1 )
(P ∗1 , P
∗
3 ) =
s′−1∑
k=1
g
(1,2)
rk(P
∗
1 )
(P ∗1 , P
∗
3 ) = g
(1,2)
a (P
∗
1 , P
∗
3 ) = 1− ε3
s′∑
k=1
g
(1,2)
rk(P
∗
1 )
(P ∗2 , P
∗
3 ) = g
(1,2)
b (P
∗
2 , P
∗
3 ) + g
(1,2)
c (P
∗
2 , P
∗
3 ) = 1
s′∑
k=1
g
(1,2)
rk(P
∗
1 )
(P ∗1 , P
∗
3 ) = g
(1,2)
a (P
∗
1 , P
∗
3 ) + g
(1,2)
c (P
∗
1 , P
∗
3 ) = 1
Therefore,
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P
∗) =
∑s′−1
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P
∗) = 1−ε3 and
∑s′
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P
∗) =
1. Hence, ϕc(P
∗) =
∑s′
k=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P
∗)−∑s′−1k=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P ∗) = ε3 and∑sk=1 ϕrk(P ∗1 )(P ∗)+
ϕc(P
∗) = 1. Then, we know that for all x ∈W (P ∗1 , b)\{c}, ϕx(P ∗) = 0. Symmetrically,
we can obtain ϕa(P
∗) = ε1, ϕx(P ∗) = 0 for all x ∈ W (P ∗2 , c)\{a}; and ϕb(P ∗) = ε2,
ϕx(P
∗) = 0 for all x ∈ W (P ∗3 , a)\{b}. In conclusion, for all x ∈ W (P ∗)\{a, b, c},
ϕx(P
∗) = 0. Furthermore, since W (P ∗) = A, we have that 1 =
∑
x∈A ϕx(P
∗) =∑
x∈W (P ∗) ϕx(P
∗) = ϕa(P ∗) + ϕb(P ∗) + ϕc(P ∗) = ε1 + ε2 + ε3. This completes the
verification of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Let D be a minimally rich domain. Suppose that every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF g : DN−1 → L(A) is a random dictatorship for N > 3. Then every
unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship.
Proof: This proposition holds when m = 3, since a domain with exact three alterna-
tives is a random dictatorship domain for the case of N − 1 voters iff it is the complete
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domain.10 We therefore need to consider m ≥ 4. The proof of the Proposition follows
from Lemmas 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Let ϕ : DN → L(A) be a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Pick two arbitrary
voters, say i and j. Define a RSCF g(i,j) as follows: for all Pi ∈ D and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2,
g(i,j)(Pi, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}).
Lemma 9 The RSCF g(i,j) is a random dictatorship for all i, j ∈ I.
Proof: This lemma follows from Lemma 3 in Sen (2011). According to the proof of
Lemma 3 in Sen (2011), the unanimity and strategy-proofness of ϕ imply that g(i,j)
is unanimous and strategy-proof. Then by the hypothesis of Proposition 5, we know
that g(i,j) is a random dictatorship.
Fix i, j ∈ I. It follows from Lemma 9 above that there exist ε(i,j), ε(i,j)k ≥ 0 for
all k 6= i, j such that ε(i,j) + ∑k 6=i,j ε(i,j)k = 1 and satisfying the following property:
ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) = g(i,j)(Pi, P−{i,j}) = ε(i,j) eb(r1(Pi)) +
∑
k 6=i,j ε
(i,j)
k eb(r1(Pk)) for all Pi ∈
D and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2. The next lemma shows that we could split the probability
ε(i,j) appropriately into two parts and together with all ε
(i,j)
k , k 6= i, j, construct a new
N -dimensional sequence of probabilities, which are able to be applied to all profiles of
preferences where voter i and j share a same preference ordering.
Lemma 10 Pick i, j ∈ I. For all P ∈ DN with Pi = Pj there exists {α(i,j; s,t)k }Nk=1 ≥ 0
with
∑N
k=1 α
(i,j; s,t)
k = 1, where s, t ∈ I\{i, j} and s 6= t, such that ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 α
(i,j; s,t)
k eb(r1(Pk)).
Proof: Now, i, j, s, t are mutually distinct. For every l 6= i, j, s, t, we consider a profile
P (l) = (Pi, Pi, Ps, Ps, Pl, P−{i,j,s,t,l}) 11 where r1(Pi) = a, r1(Ps) = b, r1(Pl) = c and
τ(P−{i,j,s,t,l}) ∩ {a, b, c} = ∅ (recall that m ≥ 4). Standard properties of g(i,j) imply
that ϕa(P
(l)) = ε(i,j), ϕb(P
(l)) = ε
(i,j)
s + ε
(i,j)
t and ϕc(P
(l)) = ε
(i,j)
l . Meanwhile, by
g(s,t), ϕa(P
(l)) = ε
(s,t)
i + ε
(s,t)
j , ϕb(P
(l)) = ε(s,t) and ϕc(P
(l)) = ε
(s,t)
l . Therefore, ε
(i,j) =
ε
(s,t)
i + ε
(s,t)
j , ε
(s,t) = ε
(i,j)
s + ε
(i,j)
t and ε
(i,j)
l = ε
(s,t)
l for all l 6= i, j, s, t. Since ε(i,j) +∑
k 6=i,j ε
(i,j)
k = 1 and ε
(s,t) +
∑
k 6=s,t ε
(s,t)
k = 1, we have ε
(s,t)
i + ε
(s,t)
j +
∑
k 6=i,j ε
(i,j)
k = 1
and ε
(i,j)
s + ε
(i,j)
t +
∑
k 6=s,t ε
(s,t)
k = 1.
Setting α
(i,j; s,t)
i = ε
(s,t)
i , α
(i,j; s,t)
j = ε
(s,t)
j , α
(i,j; s,t)
s = ε
(i,j)
s , α
(i,j; s,t)
t = ε
(i,j)
t and
α
(i,j; s,t)
l = ε
(s,t)
l = ε
(i,j)
l for all l 6= i, j, s, t, we have α(i,j; s,t)k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , N and∑N
k=1 α
(i,j; s,t)
k = 1.
Fix a profile P = (Pi, Pj , P−{i,j}) with Pi = Pj ∈ D and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2. It fol-
lows from properties of g(i,j) that ϕr1(Pi)(P ) = ε
(i,j) +
∑
k 6=i,j ε
(i,j)
k I(r1(Pk), r1(Pi)) =
10The sufficiency part is shown in Gibbard (1977), Duggan (1996) and Sen (2011). The unique seconds
property in Aswal et al. (2003) implies the necessity. Let a domain satisfy the unique seconds property.
Then this domain is not dictatorial and hence not randomly dictatorial. Furthermore, when m = 3, every
domain other than the complete domain satisfies the unique seconds property.
11If N = 4, we let P = (Pi, Pi, Ps, Ps) where r1(Pi) = a and r1(Ps) = b.
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∑N
k=1 α
(i,j; s,t)
k I(r1(Pk), r1(Pi)) and for all x ∈ A\{r1(Pi)}, ϕx(P ) =
∑
k 6=i,j ε
(i,j)
k I(r1(Pk), x) =∑N
k=1 α
(i,j; s,t)
k I(r1(Pk), x).
Note that {α(i,j; s,t)k }Nk=1 = {α(s,t; i,j)k }Nk=1, where i, j, s, t are mutually distinct. The
next lemma shows that sequence {α(i,j; s,t)k }Nk=1 is independent of {s, t} whenever s, t ∈
I\{i, j} and s 6= t.
Lemma 11 Fix i, j ∈ I. For all s, t, s¯, t¯ ∈ I\{i, j}, where s 6= t and s¯ 6= t¯, we have
{α(i,j; s,t)k }Nk=1 = {α(i,j; s¯,t¯ )k }Nk=1.
Proof: According to Lemma 10, α
(i,j; s,t)
i = ε
(s,t)
i , α
(i,j; s,t)
j = ε
(s,t)
j , ε
(s,t)
i + ε
(s,t)
j = ε
(i,j)
and α
(i,j; s,t)
k = ε
(i,j)
k for all k 6= i, j. Meanwhile, α(i,j; s¯,t¯ )i = ε(s¯,t¯ )i , α(i,j; s¯,t¯ )j = ε(s¯,t¯ )j ,
ε
(s¯,t¯ )
i +ε
(s¯,t¯ )
j = ε
(i,j) and α
(i,j; s¯,t¯ )
k = ε
(i,j)
k for all k 6= i, j. Therefore, α(i,j; s,t)i +α(i,j; s,t)j =
α
(i,j; s¯,t¯ )
i + α
(i,j; s¯,t¯ )
j and α
(i,j; s,t)
k = α
(i,j; s¯,t¯ )
k for all k 6= i, j.
Next, given a profile P = (Pi, P−i) where r1(Pi) = a and for all k, l ∈ I\{i},
Pk = Pl /∈ Da, then by both g(s,t) and g(s¯,t¯ ) respectively, we have ϕa(P ) = ε(s,t)i and
ϕa(P ) = ε
(s¯,t¯ )
i . Then, ε
(s,t)
i = ε
(s¯,t¯ )
i and hence α
(i,j; s,t)
i = α
(i,j; s¯,t¯ )
i . Consequently,
α
(i,j; s,t)
j = α
(i,j; s¯,t¯ )
j .
Fix i, j ∈ I. We have the following: for all P ∈ DN with Pi = Pj , there ex-
ists {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 ≥ 0 with
∑N
k=1 α
(i,j)
k = 1 such that ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 α
(i,j)
k eb(r1(Pk)). In
addition, {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 = {α(j,i)k }Nk=1. We next show that the sequence {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 is
independent of {i, j}.
Lemma 12 For all i, j, s, t ∈ I, where i 6= j and s 6= t, {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 = {α(s,t)k }Nk=1.
Proof: It is evident that |{i, j}∩{s, t}| = 0, 1 or 2. If |{i, j}∩{s, t}| = 0, then i, j, s, t are
mutually distinct. Hence, {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 = {α(i,j; s,t)k }Nk=1 = {α(s,t; i,j)k }Nk=1 = {α(s,t)k }Nk=1.
Next, if |{i, j}∩{s, t}| = 2, then {i, j} = {s, t}, which implies {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 = {α(s,t)k }Nk=1.
Now, we consider |{i, j} ∩ {s, t}| = 1, We can therefore assume without loss of
generality that i = s. Since N > 3, there exists another voter: voter s¯ and s¯ /∈ {i, j, t}.
For every k /∈ {i, j, t}, we consider a profile P (k) = (Pk, P−k) where Pk ∈ Da and
for all l, n ∈ I\{k}, Pl = Pn /∈ Da. By Lemma 11, it follows that ϕa(P (k)) = α(i,j)k and
ϕa(P
(k)) = α
(i,t)
k . Therefore, α
(i,j)
k = α
(i,t)
k for all k /∈ {i, j, t}.
From the case where |{i, j} ∩ {s¯, t}| = 0, we have α(i,j)j = α(s¯,t)j . Consider a profile
P = (Pj , P−j) where Pj ∈ Da and for all l, n ∈ I\{j}, Pl = Pn /∈ Da. By Lemma
11, it follows that ϕa(P ) = α
(s¯,t)
j and ϕa(P ) = α
(i,t)
j . Therefore, α
(s¯,t)
j = α
(i,t)
j . Then,
α
(i,j)
j = α
(i,t)
j . Similarly, α
(i,j)
t = α
(i,t)
t .
Finally, it is evident that α
(i,j)
i = 1 −
∑
k 6=i α
(i,j)
k = 1 −
∑
k 6=i α
(i,t)
k = α
(i,t)
i . We
therefore conclude that {α(i,j)k }Nk=1 = {α(s,t)k }Nk=1.
In conclusion, there exists {εk}Nk=1 ≥ 0 such that
∑N
k=1 εk = 1 and satisfying the
following property: for all P ∈ DN such that Pi = Pj for some i, j ∈ I, we have
ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)). Therefore, ϕ is a quasi-random dictatorship.
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Proposition 6 Let D be a minimally rich domain. Suppose that for all 2 ≤ t < N ,
every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF g : Dt → L(A) is a random dictatorship. If
a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DN → L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship,
then ϕ is a random dictatorship.
Proof: The proof proceeds in a sequence of lemmas. Let {εk}Nk=1 ≥ 0 with
∑N
k=1 εk = 1
be the sequence that ϕ satisfies in Definition 20.
Lemma 13 For all P ∈ DN , if there exist i, j ∈ I such that r1(Pi) = r1(Pj), then
ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)).
Proof: Fix a profile P = (Pi, Pj , P−{i,j}). Assume that r1(Pi) = r1(Pj) = x0 and
τ(P−{i,j})\{x0} = {xk}lk=1 where 0 ≤ l ≤ N−2 and all elements in {xk}lk=1 are distinct.
If τ(P−{i,j})\{x0} = ∅, then τ(P ) = {x0} and unanimity gives the result. We complete
the proof by considering τ(P−{i,j})\{x0} 6= ∅. By strategy-proofness and quasi-random
dictatorship, we have ϕx0(P ) = ϕx0(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) = εi+εj+
∑
k 6=i,j εk I(r1(Pk), x0) =∑N
k=1 εk I(r1(Pk), x0).
Next, for the relative rankings of all elements in {xk}lk=1 in Pi, we could assume
without loss of generality that xt = rkt(Pi), t = 1, . . . , l and k1 < k2 < · · · < kl. By
strategy-proofness, for all s ≥ 2, ∑sν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) ≤ ∑sν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) ≤∑s
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}).
Next, according to quasi-random dictatorship, we have that for t = 1, . . . , l,
kt−1∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) =
kt−1∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j})
= εi + εj +
∑
k 6=i,j
εk
[ t−1∑
s=0
I(r1(Pk), xs)
]
and
kt∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) =
kt∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j})
= εi + εj +
∑
k 6=i,j
εk
[ t∑
s=0
I(r1(Pk), xs)
]
Consequently, for t = 1, . . . , l,
∑kt−1
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) = εi+εj+
∑
k 6=i,j εk
[∑t−1
s=0 I(r1(Pk), xs)
]
and
∑kt
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) = εi + εj +
∑
k 6=i,j εk
[∑t
s=0 I(r1(Pk), xs)
]
. Hence, for t =
1, . . . , l, ϕxt(P ) =
∑kt
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) −
∑kt−1
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) =
∑
k 6=i,j εk I(r1(Pk), xt) =∑N
k=1 εk I(r1(Pk), xt).
Therefore,
∑
x∈τ(P ) ϕx(P ) ≡
∑l
i=0 ϕxi(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk = 1. Then, for all x /∈ τ(P ),
ϕx(P ) = 0. In conclusion, ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εkeb(r1(Pk)).
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If m < N , then for all P ∈ DN , there always exist at least two voters who share
a common maximal alternative. Then, Lemma 13 implies that ϕ is a random dicta-
torship. We complete the proof by considering m ≥ N . Given a profile P ∈ DN with
|τ(P )| = N , recall W (P ) = ∪Nk=1W
(
Pk,max(Pk, τ(P−k))
)
.
Lemma 14 For all P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , we have |τ(P ) ∩W (P )| ≥ N − 1.
Proof: This lemma asserts that for every profile P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , τ(P ) and
W (P ) have at least N − 1 alternatives in common.
Suppose not. Then there exists P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N such that |τ(P )∩W (P )| <
N − 1. Hence, there exist a, b ∈ τ(P )\W (P ). Since |τ(P )| = N and N ≥ 3, we know
that there exists Pi ∈ Dc for some i ∈ I such that c /∈ {a, b}. Let max(Pi, τ(P−i)) = x.
If x /∈ {a, b}, we know that {a, b} ⊆ W (Pi, x) which implies that {a, b} ⊆ W (P ). If
x = a, then b ∈ W (Pi, x) which implies that b ∈ W (P ). If x = b, then a ∈ W (Pi, x)
which implies that a ∈W (P ). We have a contradiction.
Lemma 15 For all P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N and x ∈ W (P ), we have ϕx(P ) =∑N
k=1 εk I(r1(Pk), x).
Proof: Fix voter i. Assume without loss of generality that τ(P−i) = {xk}N−1k=1 , xt =
rkt(Pi), t = 1, . . . , N − 1, k1 < k2 < · · · < kN−1 and x1 = r1(Pj) for some j ∈ I\{i}.
By strategy-proofness, we have that
∑s
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) ≤
∑s
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) ≤∑s
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) for all s ≥ k1.
According to quasi-random dictatorship, we have the following:
k1∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) =
k1∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) = εi + εj
and for t = 2, . . . , N − 1,
kt−1∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) =
kt−1∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j})
= εi + εj +
∑
k 6=i,j
εk
[ t−1∑
s=2
I(r1(Pk), xs)
]
and
kt∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pj , Pj , P−{i,j}) =
kt∑
ν=1
ϕrν(Pi)(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j})
= εi + εj +
∑
k 6=i,j
εk
[ t∑
s=2
I(r1(Pk), xs)
]
Then, similar to the proof of Lemma 13, we have
∑k1
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) = εi + εj and
ϕxt(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk I(r1(Pk), xt), for t = 2, . . . , N−1. Since |τ(P )| = N and τ(P−{i,j}) =
29
{xt}N−1t=2 , we know that ϕr1(Pk)(P ) = εk for all k 6= i, j. Then,
∑k1
ν=1 ϕrν(Pi)(P ) +∑
k 6=i,j ϕr1(Pk)(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk = 1. Therefore, for all x ∈ W (Pi, x1)\{xt}N−1t=2 , ϕx(P ) =
0. In conclusion, for all x ∈W (Pi, x1), ϕx(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk I(r1(Pk), x).
Applying the same argument to all other voters, we have ϕx(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk I(r1(Pk), x)
for all x ∈W (P ).
From Lemma 15, we can infer that for all P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , if τ(P ) ⊆W (P ),
then ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)). By Lemmas 14 and 15, we know that for every P ∈ DN
with |τ(P )| = N , the probabilities over at least N − 1 elements of τ(P ) in ϕ(P ) are
revealed.
In the next lemma, we will identify properties that a profile P and ϕ(P ) must
satisfy if ϕ(P ) 6= ∑Nk=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)). Given a profile P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , let
B¯i(P ) = B
(
Pi,max(Pi, τ(P−i))
)∖
{r1(Pi)}, i ∈ I and B¯(P ) = ∩Ni=1B¯i(P ).
Lemma 16 Let P ∈ DN be a profile. If ϕ(P ) 6= ∑Nk=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)), then the following
conditions must be satisfied:
(i) |τ(P )| = N .
(ii) There exists i ∈ I such that ϕr1(Pi)(P ) < εi and ϕr1(Pk)(P ) = εk for all k 6= i.
(iii) r1(Pi) = max(Pk, τ(P−k)) for all k 6= i.
(iv) ϕr1(Pi)(P ) +
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P ) = εi.
(v) B¯(P ) 6= ∅. Furthermore, there exists x ∈ B¯(P ) such that ϕx(P ) > 0.
Proof: (i) Since ϕ(P ) 6= ∑Nk=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)), Lemma 13 implies that |τ(P )| = N .
(ii) According to Lemmas 14 and 15 and the hypothesis ϕ(P ) 6= ∑Nk=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)),
it must be true that |τ(P ) ∩ W (P )| = N − 1. Assume without loss of generality
that r1(Pi) /∈W (P ). Then, by Lemma 15, we have that for all k 6= i, ϕr1(Pk)(P ) = εk.
Consequently, ϕr1(Pi)(P ) ≤ 1−
∑
k 6=i ϕr1(Pk)(P ) = εi. This implies that ϕr1(Pi)(P ) < εi,
otherwise ϕ(P ) =
∑N
k=1 εkeb(r1(Pk)).
(iii) The proof of statement (ii) shows that r1(Pi) /∈W (P ), which implies that r1(Pi) =
max(Pk, τ(P−k)) for all k 6= i.
(iv) Assume without loss of generality that max(Pi, τ(P−i)) = r1(Pj) for some j ∈ I\{i}
and let r1(Pj) = rs(Pi). Then, as we showed in the proof of Lemma 15, εi + εj =∑s
k=1 ϕrk(Pi)(P ) =
∑s−1
k=1 ϕrk(Pi)(P ) + ϕr1(Pj)(P ) = ϕr1(Pi)(P ) +
∑
x∈B¯i(P ) ϕx(P ) +
ϕr1(Pj)(P ). Furthermore, statement (ii) implies that ϕr1(Pj)(P ) = εj . Hence, ϕr1(Pi)(P )+∑
x∈B¯i(P ) ϕx(P ) = εi. Next, since B¯i(P )\B¯(P ) ⊂ W (P ) and B¯(P ) ⊆ B¯i(P ), we have
ϕx(P ) = 0 for all x ∈ B¯i(P )\B¯(P ) by Lemma 15 and ϕr1(Pi)(P )+
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P ) = εi.
(v) By statements (ii) and (iv), we know that
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P ) > 0, which implies that
B¯(P ) 6= ∅ and furthermore, there exists x ∈ B¯(P ) such that ϕx(P ) > 0.
The voter i specified in statement (ii) of Lemma 16 is called the special voter of P .
As we showed in the proof of statement (ii) of Lemma 16, we know that the peak of
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the special voter of P does not belong to W (P ). It is evident that in a profile P with
ϕ(P ) 6= ∑Nk=1 εkeb(r1(Pk)), there exists a unique special voter.
We next show what property the sequence {εk}Nk=1 must satisfy, when there exists
a profile P ∗ such that ϕ(P ∗) 6= ∑Nk=1 εkeb(r1(P ∗k )).
Lemma 17 If there exists P ∗ ∈ DN such that ϕ(P ∗) 6= ∑Nk=1 εk eb(r1(P ∗k )), then 0 <
εk < 1, k = 1, . . . , N .
Proof: Suppose there exists εk = 0. Fix P
∗
k (the kth element of P
∗). Define a RSCF:
g(P−k) = ϕ(P ∗k , P−k) for all P−k ∈ DN−1. The strategy-proofness of ϕ implies that g is
strategy-proof. Next, Lemma 13 implies that g is unanimous. Furthermore, according
to Lemma 16 (v), we know that there exists x /∈ τ(P ∗) such that ϕx(P ∗) > 0. There-
fore, gx(P
∗
−k) = ϕx(P
∗
k , P
∗
−k) > 0 where x /∈ τ(P ∗−k), which implies that RSCF g is not
a random dictatorship. This is a contradiction to the hypothesis of Proposition 6.
Next, suppose that there exists εk = 1. Then, there exists j 6= k such that εj = 0,
which would lead to the same contradiction.
In the next lemma, we show it is true that for all P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , ϕ(P ) =∑N
k=1 εkeb(r1(Pk)) by contradiction. Suppose ϕ is not a random dictatorship. Then we
construct a RSCF h : D2 → L(A) and show it is unanimous and strategy-proof and
not a random dictatorship, which hence contradicts the hypothesis of Proposition 6.
Lemma 18 For all P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N , we have ϕ(P ) = ∑Nk=1 εk eb(r1(Pk)).
Proof: Suppose RSCF ϕ is not a random dictatorship with respect to {εk}Nk=1. Then,
there exists P ∗ ∈ DN such that ϕ(P ∗) 6= ∑Nk=1 εkeb(r1(P ∗k )). By Lemma 16 (ii) and (v),
we know that there exist a special voter of P ∗ and y /∈ τ(P ∗) such that ϕy(P ∗) > 0.
Assume without loss of generality that voter 1 be the special voter of P ∗. Next, pick
arbitrarily another voter, i.e., voter 2 and fix P ∗−{1,2} (elements in P
∗ other than P ∗1
and P ∗2 ). By Lemma 17, we can construct the following function: for all P1, P2 ∈ D,
h(P1, P2) =

ε1
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P1)) +
ε2
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P2)) if ϕr1(P1)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) ≥ ε1
and ϕr1(P2)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) ≥ ε2
1
ε1+ε2
[
ϕ(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2})−
N∑
k=3
εkeb(r1(P ∗k ))
]
otherwise
Note that Lemma 16 (ii) implies that it is impossible that ϕr1(P1)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) <
ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) < ε2 simultaneously. Therefore, given P = (P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}),
by Lemma 16 (ii) and (iv), when either ϕr1(P1)(P ) < ε1 or ϕr1(P2)(P ) < ε2, h(P1, P2)
must be specified as below:
if ϕr1(P1)(P ) < ε1, then
h(P1, P2) =
1
ε1 + ε2
[
ϕr1(P1)(P ) eb(r1(P1)) +
∑
x∈B¯(P )
ϕx(P ) eb(x) + ε2 eb(r1(P2))
]
(1)
where ϕr1(P1)(P ) +
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P ) = ε1; and if ϕr1(P2)(P ) < ε2, then
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h(P1, P2) =
1
ε1 + ε2
[
ε1 eb(r1(P1)) + ϕr1(P2)(P ) eb(r1(P2)) +
∑
x∈B¯(P )
ϕx(P ) eb(x)
]
(2)
where ϕr1(P2)(P ) +
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P ) = ε2.
Next, we will show that h is a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Furthermore,
to complete the proof of Lemma 18, we also show that h is not a random dictatorship
which contradicts the hypothesis of Proposition 6.
Claim 1: Function h is a RSCF.
Firstly, if ϕr1(P1)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) ≥ ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P1, P2, P ∗−{1,2}) ≥ ε2, it is evident
that hx(P1, P2) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A and
∑
x∈A hx(P1, P2) = 1. Secondly, if either
ϕr1(P1)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) < ε1 or ϕr1(P2)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) < ε2, either equation (1) or (2)
above implies that hx(P1, P2) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A and
∑
x∈A hx(P1, P2) = 1. This
completes the verification of Claim 1.
Claim 2: RSCF h is unanimous.
Let r1(P1) = r1(P2) = a. Then, by Lemma 13, we know that ϕa(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) =
ε1+ε2+
∑N
k=3 εkI(a, r1(P
∗
k )). Hence, ϕr1(P1)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) = ϕa(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) ≥ ε1
and ϕr1(P2)(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) = ϕa(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) ≥ ε2. Consequently, ha(P1, P2) =
ε1
ε1+ε2
+ ε2ε1+ε2 = 1. This completes the verification of Claim 2.
Claim 3: RSCF h is not a random dictatorship.
Since we have assumed that voter 1 is the special voter of P ∗, it is true that
ϕr1(P ∗1 )(P
∗) < ε1 by Lemma 16 (ii). Consequently, h(P ∗1 , P ∗2 ) follows from equation
(1). Next, since we have assumed that ϕy(P
∗) > 0 where y /∈ τ(P ∗) in the beginning
proof of Lemma 18, we have that hy(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 ) > 0 and y /∈ τ(P ∗1 , P ∗2 ), which implies
that h is not a random dictatorship. This completes the verification of Claim 3.
Claim 4: RSCF h is strategy-proof.
We consider the possible manipulation of voter 1 in h. Firstly, it is evident that the
manipulation only occurs at (P1, P2) via P
′
1 where either h(P1, P2) =
ε1
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P1)) +
ε2
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P2)) and h(P
′
1, P2) =
1
ε1+ε2
[
ϕ(P ′1, P2, P ∗−{1,2})−
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P ∗k ))
]
, or h(P1, P2) =
1
ε1+ε2
[
ϕ(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2})−
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P ∗k ))
]
and h(P ′1, P2) =
ε1
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P ′1))+
ε2
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P2)).
Secondly, if ϕ(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) = ε1eb(r1(P1)) + ε2eb(r1(P2)) +
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P ∗k )), then
h(P1, P2) =
ε1
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P1))+
ε2
ε1+ε2
eb(r1(P2)) =
1
ε1+ε2
[
ϕ(P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2})−
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P ∗k ))
]
,
which implies that there exists no manipulation at (P1, P2) via P
′
1 or at (P
′
1, P2) via P1.
Therefore, given two profiles P = (P1, P2, P
∗
−{1,2}) and P
′ = (P ′1, P2, P ∗−{1,2}) such
that ϕ(P ) 6= ε1eb(r1(P1)) + ε2eb(r1(P2)) +
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P ∗k )) and ϕ(P
′) 6= ε1eb(r1(P ′1)) +
ε2eb(r1(P2)) +
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P ∗k )), the manipulation at (P1, P2) via P
′
1 may occur in fol-
lowing 4 cases. 12
12Since ϕ(P ) 6= ε1eb(r1(P1)) + ε2eb(r1(P2)) +
∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P∗k )) and ϕ(P
′) 6= ε1eb(r1(P ′1)) + ε2eb(r1(P2)) +∑N
k=3 εkeb(r1(P∗k )), we could apply Lemma 16 to P and P
′ in the analysis of the following 4 cases.
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Case 1: (i) ϕr1(P1)(P ) ≥ ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P ) ≥ ε2, and (ii) ϕr1(P ′1)(P ′) < ε1.
Now, h(P ′1, P2) follows from equation (1). Then, given u ∈ U(P1), the loss from mis-
representation in h is U1(P1, P2)−U1(P ′1, P2) = 1ε1+ε2
[
ε1u(r1(P1))−ϕr1(P ′1)(P ′)u(r1(P ′1))−∑
x∈B¯(P ′) ϕx(P
′)u(x)
]
≥ 0. This completes the verification of Case 1.
Case 2: (i) ϕr1(P1)(P ) ≥ ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P ) ≥ ε2, and (ii) ϕr1(P2)(P ′) < ε2.
We first claim that this case only occurs when N = 3. Suppose not, i.e., N ≥ 4.
Since ϕr1(P1)(P ) ≥ ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P ) ≥ ε2, by Lemma 16 (ii), we assume without loss
of generality that voter i, where i ∈ {3, . . . , N}, is the special voter of P . Next, since
N ≥ 4, there must exist another voter, i.e., voter j such that j /∈ {1, 2, i}. Furthermore,
applying Lemma 16 (iii) to P , we know that r1(Pi)Pj r1(P2). In the other hand,
ϕr1(P2)(P
′) < ε2 indicates that voter 2 is the special voter of P ′. Therefore, applying
Lemma 16 (iii) to P ′, we have that r1(P2)Pj r1(Pi). Contradiction!
Now, by Lemma 16 (i), to simplify the notation, we can assume that r1(P1) = a,
r1(P2) = c, r1(P
∗
3 ) = f and r1(P
′
1) = d, where a, c, f are mutually distinct and d, c, f
are mutually distinct. (it is possible that a = d) Furthermore, h(P ′1, P2) follows from
equation (2). Therefore, given u ∈ U(P1), the loss from misrepresentation in h is
U1(P1, P2)−U1(P ′1, P2) =
1
ε1 + ε2
[
ε1u(a)+ε2u(c)−ε1u(d)−ϕc(P ′)u(c)−
∑
x∈B¯(P ′)
ϕx(P
′)u(x)
]
where ε2 = ϕc(P
′) +
∑
x∈B¯(P ′) ϕx(P
′).
To show that U1(P1, P2)−U1(P ′1, P2) ≥ 0, We will consider the following 2 situations:
dP1c and cP1d.
Firstly, we claim that if dP1c then U1(P1, P2) − U1(P ′1, P2) ≥ 0. Since either a =
d or aP1d, to verify the claim, we only need to show that cP1x for all x ∈ B¯(P ′)
with ϕx(P
′) > 0. Suppose not, i.e., there exists x∗ ∈ B¯(P ′) such that ϕx∗(P ′) > 0
and x∗P1c. In profile P , since ϕa(P ) ≥ ε1, ϕc(P ) ≥ ε2 and N = 3, by Lemma 16
(ii) and (iii), we know that voter 3 is the special voter of P and fP1c. Let x
′ =
min(P1, {x∗, d, f}). Hence x′P1c. Assume x′ = rs(P1). As we showed in the proof
of Lemma 15,
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P ) = ε1 + ε3. Meanwhile, Lemma 16 (ii) implies that
ϕd(P
′) = ε1 and ϕf (P ′) = ε3. Then, ϕx∗(P ′) > 0 implies that
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P ) <
ε1 + ε3 + ϕx∗(P
′) = ϕd(P ′) + ϕf (P ′) + ϕx∗(P ′) ≤
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P
′). Therefore, voter
1 manipulates at P via P ′1 in ϕ - a contradiction.
Next, we claim that that if cP1d then U1(P1, P2) − U1(P ′1, P2) ≥ 0. Now, it is
evident that a 6= d. Since c /∈ B¯(P ′), we separate B¯(P ′) into two parts S and T
as follows: for all x ∈ S, xP1c and for all z ∈ T , cP1z. If S = ∅, then for all
x ∈ B¯(P ′), cP1x. Therefore, it is true that U1(P1, P2) − U1(P ′1, P2) = ε1ε1+ε2
[
u(a) −
u(d)
]
+ 1ε1+ε2
∑
x∈B¯(P ′) ϕx(P
′)
[
u(c)− u(x)
]
≥ 0.
Next, consider S 6= ∅. Let x∗ = max(P1, S). Then it is true that (i) either aP1x∗
or a = x∗, (ii) x∗P1c, (iii) cP1d and (iv) cP1z for all z ∈ T (if T 6= ∅). Furthermore,
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U1(P1, P2)− U1(P ′1, P2) could be modified as follows:
U1(P1, P2)− U1(P ′1, P2)
=
1
ε1 + ε2
[
ε1u(a) + ε2u(c)− ε1u(d)− ϕc(P ′)u(c)−
∑
x∈S
ϕx(P
′)u(x)−
∑
z∈T
ϕz(P
′)u(z)
]
≥ 1
ε1 + ε2
[
ε1u(a) + ε2u(c)− ε1u(d)− ϕc(P ′)u(c)− u(x∗)
∑
x∈S
ϕx(P
′)−
∑
z∈T
ϕz(P
′)u(z)
]
=
ε1
ε1 + ε2
[
u(a)− u(x∗)
]
+
ε1 −
∑
x∈S
ϕx(P
′)
ε1 + ε2
[
u(x∗)− u(c)
]
+
ε1
ε1 + ε2
[
u(c)− u(d)
]
+
1
ε1 + ε2
∑
z∈T
ϕz(P
′)
[
u(c)− u(z)
]
Therefore, according to the relative rankings in P1 specified above, to show that
U1(P1, P2)− U1(P ′1, P2) ≥ 0, it suffices to show ε1 ≥
∑
x∈S ϕx(P
′).
Assume min(P1, S) = y
∗ and let z∗ = min(P1, {f, y∗}). Assume z∗ = rs(P1).
Hence, {rk(P1)}sk=1 = B(P1, z∗) ∪ {z∗}. In profile P , since ϕa(P ) ≥ ε1, ϕc(P ) ≥ ε2
and N = 3, by Lemma 16 (ii) and (iii), we know that voter 3 is the special voter
of P and fP1c. Hence, z
∗P1c. Therefore, as we showed in the proof of Lemma 15,
we have that
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P ) = ε1 + ε3. Next, in profile P
′, by Lemma 16 (ii) and
(iv), we know that for all z /∈ {d, c, f} ∪ B¯(P ′), ϕz(P ′) = 0. Furthermore, since
[B(P1, z
∗) ∪ {z∗}] ∩ {d, c, f} = {f} and [B(P1, z∗) ∪ {z∗}] ∩ B¯(P ′) = S, we have
that
∑s
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P
′) ≡ ∑x∈B(P1,z∗)∪{z∗} ϕx(P ′) = ϕf (P ′) + ∑x∈S ϕx(P ′) = ε3 +∑
x∈S ϕx(P
′) (Lemma 16 (ii) implies that ϕf (P ′) = ε3). Then, the strategy-proofness
of ϕ implies that ε1 ≥
∑
x∈S ϕx(P
′). This completes the verification of Case 2.
Case 3: (i) ϕr1(P1)(P ) < ε1, and (ii) ϕr1(P ′1)(P
′) ≥ ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P ′) ≥ ε2.
Now, h(P1, P2) follows from equation (1). Then, given u ∈ U(P1), the loss from
misrepresentation in h is
U1(P1, P2)− U1(P ′1, P2) =
1
ε1 + ε2
[
ϕr1(P1)(P )u(r1(P1)) +
∑
x∈B¯(P )
ϕx(P )u(x)− ε1u(r1(P ′1))
]
where ϕr1(P1)(P ) +
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P ) = ε1.
Firstly, since ϕr1(P1)(P ) < ε1 and ϕr1(P ′1)(P
′) ≥ ε1, strategy-proofness implies
that r1(P1) 6= r1(P ′1). Next, it is evident that r1(P1)P1 r1(P ′1). Therefore, to show
U1(P1, P2) − U1(P ′1, P2) ≥ 0, it suffices to show that for all x ∈ B¯(P ) with ϕx(P ) > 0
and x 6= r1(P ′1), xP1r1(P ′1).
Now, suppose there exists z′ ∈ B¯(P ) such that ϕz′(P ) > 0 and r1(P ′1)P1z′. Firstly,
B¯(P ) ⊆ B¯1(P ) implies that z′ ∈ B¯1(P ). Let s1 and s2 be such that r1(P ′1) = rs1(P1)
and z′ = rs2(P1). Hence, 1 < s1 < s2. As we showed in the proof of Lemma 16
(iv), ϕr1(P1)(P ) +
∑
x∈B¯1(P ) ϕx(P ) = ε1. Then, ϕz′(P ) > 0 and z
′ ∈ B¯1(P ) imply
that
∑s1
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P ) <
∑s2
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P ) ≤ ε1 = ϕr1(P ′1)(P ′) ≤
∑s1
k=1 ϕrk(P1)(P
′).
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Therefore, voter 1 manipulates at P via P ′1 in ϕ - a contradiction. This complete the
verification of Case 3.
Case 4: (i) ϕr1(P2)(P ) < ε2, and (ii) ϕr1(P ′1)(P
′) ≥ ε1 and ϕr1(P2)(P ′) ≥ ε2.
As in Case 2, we can claim that this case only occur when N = 3. Now, h(P1, P2)
follows from equation (2). Since ϕr1(P2)(P ) < ε2, we know that voter 2 is the special
voter of P by Lemma 16 (ii). Hence, for all x ∈ B¯(P ), xP1r1(P2) by Lemma 16 (iii).
Then, given u ∈ U(P1), the loss from manipulation in h is U1(P1, P2) − U1(P ′1, P2) =
ε1
ε1+ε2
[
u(r1(P1))−u(r1(P ′1))
]
+ 1ε1+ε2
∑
x∈B¯(P ) ϕx(P )
[
u(x)−u(r1(P2))
]
≥ 0. This com-
pletes the verification of Case 4.
Finally, using symmetric arguments for voter 2, we conclude that h is strategy-proof.
This completes the verification of Claim 4 and the proof of Lemma 18.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 6 and Theorem 3.
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